<?xml version="1.0"?>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"><rdf:Description rdf:about="https://dk.um.si/IzpisGradiva.php?id=66413"><dc:title>Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders</dc:title><dc:creator>Perc,	Matjaž	(Avtor)
	</dc:creator><dc:subject>cooperation</dc:subject><dc:subject>public goods</dc:subject><dc:subject>punishment</dc:subject><dc:subject>institutions</dc:subject><dc:subject>phase transitions</dc:subject><dc:subject>physics of social systems</dc:subject><dc:description>Although empirical and theoretical studies affirm that punishment can elevate collaborative efforts, its emergence and stability remain elusive. By peer-punishment the sanctioning is something an individual elects to do depending on the strategies in its neighborhood. The consequences of unsustainable efforts are therefore local. By pool-punishment, on the other hand, where resources for sanctioning are committed in advance and at large, the notion of sustainability has greater significance. In a population with free-riders, punishers must be strong in numbers to keep the "punishment pool" from emptying. Failure to do so renders the concept of institutionalized sanctioning futile. We show that pool-punishment in structured populations is sustainable, but only if second-order free-riders are sanctioned as well, and to a such degree that they cannot prevail. A discontinuous phase transition leads to an outbreak of sustainability when punishers subvert second-order free-riders in the competition against defectors.</dc:description><dc:date>2012</dc:date><dc:date>2017-06-23 13:10:24</dc:date><dc:type>Članek v reviji</dc:type><dc:identifier>66413</dc:identifier><dc:language>sl</dc:language></rdf:Description></rdf:RDF>
