20.500.12556/DKUM-17861 VPRAŠANJE SVOBODE IN DETERMINIZMA PRI STOIKIH THE QUESTION OF FREEDOM AND DETERMINISM WITH STOICS V seminarski nalogi smo razpravljali o stoiškem pojmovanju svobode in determinizma iz stališča dveh avtorjev. Gouldova kritika, znotraj njegovega dela Stoiško pojmovanje usode, se usmeri na stoike ter njihov neuspeh v poskušanju definiranja človeka kot svobodnega znotraj determinističnega sveta. Stoiki so bili veliki privrženci ideje determinizma, po kateri je dogodek determiniran, kadar obstajajo predhodni pogoji tako, da je njihov nastop zadostni pogoj za nastop tega dogodka. Problem pa nastopi, ko stoiki želijo vzporedno s to idejo ohraniti status posameznika kot odgovornega za svoja dejanja in posledično kot svobodnega. Gould le to ostro zavrača in dokazuje, da jim kaj takšnega nikakor ni uspelo. Avtorica Botros pa v svojem delu Svoboda, vzročnost, fatalizem in zgodnja stoiška filozofija, Gouldovo kritiko le še nadgradi in trdi, da se stoikom ta problem, ki nastane z združevanjem ideje determinizma in svobodne volje sploh ni pripetil, saj se s tem niso ukvarjali. Stoike so mnogi obravnavali kot mehke deterministe, ki so zagovarjali idejo determinizma in obenem trdili, da ljudje imamo svobodno voljo, Botrosova pa temu ostro nasprotuje in zagovarja, da stoiki v tradicionalnem smislu nikakor niso bili mehki deterministi. To se kaže v njihovem ne hotenju po analiziranju svobode v terminih 'moč ravnati drugače', kar je posledično tudi pomenilo, da se jim konflikt med svobodo in determinizmom ni mogel pripetiti. In this seminar paper we discussed the stoics' conception of freedom and determinism from the perspective of two authors. Gould's critic throughout his work The Stoic Conception of Fate, focuses on their failure in trying to define a person as free within deterministic world. Stoics were great defenders of the idea of determinism according to which an act is determined when there are precedent conditions so that their appearance is sufficient condition for the appearance of the act. The problem evolves when stoics want, parallel to the idea mentioned, to keep the status of an individual as responsible for his/her acts and consequently as free. Gould is firmly rejecting this and proving that stoics failed in doing so. In her work Freedom, Causality, Fatalism and Early Stoic Philosophy, Botros just upgrades Gould's critic and claims that the stoics never faced this problem which evolves with trying to join the idea of determinism and free will, because they never dealt with it. Many treated stoisc as soft determinists which argued the idea of determinism and at the same time claimed that people have free will. Botros is strongly against such view and defends that stoics, in traditional sense, absolutely were not soft determinists. This is seen in their unwillingness to analyze freedom in terms of 'the power to do otherwise', which consequently meant that the conflict between freedom and determinism could not happen to them. Svoboda determinizem stoiki usoda vzročnost. Freedom determinism stoics fate causality. true true false [T. Valente] Slovenski jezik Angleški jezik Diplomsko delo 2011-03-23 16:29:33 2021-01-29 14:41:47 2022-04-13 10:13:18 2023-12-22 03:32:52 2009 0 Maribor 0 0000-00-00 NiDoloceno NiDoloceno NiDoloceno 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 1(043.2) 17085960 URN:SI:UM:DK:K5XTY98S UNI_Valente_Tanja_2011.pdf UNI_Valente_Tanja_2011.pdf 1 38602EF7C05B17B16FBEB57447D53F26 c45408d191846e45f069b78dea8c077ff896c026f79eecd6ad3f59f4662a1405 fdd435fe-7c04-11eb-bb7a-00155d0001ca 20.500.12556/dkum/92df6f6b-bb9f-4e12-9f19-93f242fc6310 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=21043 Filozofska fakulteta 0 0 0