20.500.12556/DKUM-26055 Uncertainties facilitate aggressive behavior in a spatial hawk-dove game We study effects of additive spatiotemporal random variations, introduced to the payoffs of a spatial hawk-dove game, on the evolution of the reconciliatory and the aggressive strategy. We show that uncertainties facilitate aggressive behavior for a broad range of resource values. In particular, aggressors thrive best if stochastic influences are of the order of magnitude of deterministic payoff values. We argue that random payoff variations are potent and plausible promoters of aggressive behavior in human as well as animal societies if only the hawk-dove game payoff ranking applies. evolutionary game theory hawk-dove game noise spatial games evolucijska teorija iger igra sokola in goloba šum prostorske igre true true false Angleški jezik Angleški jezik Članek v reviji 2012-05-31 11:46:41 2012-05-31 11:46:41 2024-02-16 08:55:07 2024-02-17 03:17:47 2007 0 0 0000-00-00 NiDoloceno NiDoloceno NiDoloceno 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 519.83:534 12133398 0218-1274 URN:SI:UM:DK:ZMHZ2T5N http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S0218127407019779 1 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=34973 Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko 0 0 0