20.500.12556/DKUM-35880 Is color-dispositionalism nasty and unecological? This article is a brief presentation and defense of response-dispositionalist intentionalism against a family of objections. The view claims that for a surface to have an objective stable color is to have a disposition to cause innormal observers a response, namely, intentional phenomenal-color experience. The objections, raised recently by M. Johnston, B. Stroud, and by Byrne and Hilbert, claim that any dispositionalist view is unfair to the naiveperceiverthinker, saddles her with massive error and represents her as maladaptated to her environment. The paper reconstructs the main line of thought in favor of response-intentionalism and argues that it is in fact rather charitable and fair to naive cognizers, and also avoids a cluster of related objections. philosophy color-dispositionalism objections intencionalizem dispozicionalizem barv objektivizacija true true true Angleški jezik Slovenski jezik Članek v reviji 2012-06-07 12:32:34 2012-06-07 12:32:35 2024-06-01 03:15:39 2019-07-10 14:03:14 2007 0 0 0000-00-00 NiDoloceno NiDoloceno NiDoloceno 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 165 15802632 0165-0106 URN:SI:UM:DK:Y1UTNYIM http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-006-9036-8 1 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=46908 RAZ_Miscevic_Nenad_2007.pdf RAZ_Miscevic_Nenad_2007.pdf 1 7E6D961198971436A37AA62D1147A515 bdd9570b56d442b455fc6ece2583f206b0777800e73279d6783b0440c5c3c8a7 b97d4b84-1f31-11ef-bf9d-00155d000105 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=180046 Filozofska fakulteta 0 0 0