20.500.12556/DKUM-48508 Vloga in zloraba Centralne obveščevalne agencije v primeru napada na Irak leta 2003 diplomsko delo univerzitetnega študija The role of Central Intelligence Agency and its misuse in the case of an attack on Iraq in 2003 Namen ustanovitve CIE je bil predvsem zagotoviti, da v prihodnosti ne bo prišlo do velikih katastrof, kot je bil na primer japonski napad na Pearl Harbor leta 1941. Vendar je delo obveščevalnih služb v nekaterih primerih tudi neuspešno, bodisi zaradi dejstva, ker je nemogoče vedno popolnoma predvideti situacijo, ali pa zaradi politike, ki mnogokrat prezre ocene obveščevalnih služb, če niso v skladu z njenimi prepričanji ali interesi. Za enega najbolj znanih obveščevalnih neuspehov velja teroristični napad na Svetovni trgovinski center leta 2001, ki je dve leti kasneje posledično pripeljal do ponovnega vprašanja o zakonitosti dela ameriške obveščevalne službe CIE. Govorimo o ameriški invaziji na Irak leta 2003 s strani administracije G. Busha mlajšega, ki je prezrla oziroma celo namerno priredila ocene CIE glede iraškega posedovanja OMU. Omenjena orožja so bila, poleg teroristične grožnje, ki naj bi jo po besedah Bele hiše predstavljal Sadam Husein, uradno glavni vzrok za napad na Irak. Po koncu prve zalivske vojne se je v Iraku začelo razoroževanje in s tem posledični nadzori inšpektorjev s strani ZN, ki so preverjali tudi prisotnost OMU. Kljub dejstvu da je ameriški nacionalni sekretar Colin Powell pred VS ZN novembra 2002 predstavil dokaze o prisotnosti OMU v Iraku, se postavi vprašanje, ali so bili ti dokazi resnični in zakonito pridobljeni. Odgovor je seveda negativen, celo Kongres ZDA je sčasoma izjavil, da je Busheva administracija pretiravala glede terorističnih groženj s strani Huseina ter se oprla na nezanesljive obveščevalne izsledke (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2014). Kljub odločitvi VS ZN, da ne podpre Bele hiše pri invazije leta 2003, je Bush ustanovil Koalicijo voljnih, s pomočjo katere je vdrl v Irak. Številni analitiki, organizacije in mediji si delo obveščevalne skupnosti ter pritiske s strani političnega vrha, v omenjenem primeru, razlagajo po svoje. Določeni zagovarjajo zakonitost in suverenost takratnega dela obveščevalnih služb, spet drugi so mnenja, da je politika diktirala delo le-tem. Direktor CIE, George Tenet, je zapisal, da je CIA Beli hiši predala nezanesljive podatke, ki so v veliki meri temeljile na domnevah o iraškem orožju. Bela hiša pa je te ocene priredila in jih kot takšne lažno predstavila VS ZN ter širši javnosti. Takšno ravnanje ameriškega političnega vrha kaže na manipulativno in samovoljno delo politike, hkrati pa omadežuje obveščevalno skupnost in njeno delo v javnosti. The main purpose of CIA foundation was to prevent great security catastrophes like Japanese secret attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941 in the future. However the work of intelligence agencies is sometimes unsuccessful. One of the reasons is the fact that it is impossible to predict the situation perfectly or politics that rather ignores evaluations of intelligence service that goes against their beliefs and decisions. One of the most known intelligence failures is terroristic attack in 2001 on World Trade Center that has led to question the legality of work of CIA two years later. We are talking about the American invasion on Iraq in 2003, where administration of Mr. Bush Jr. overlooked or deliberately falsified evaluations of the CIA concerning possession of WMD in Iraq. Mentioned weapons were, in addition of terrorist threat by Saddam Hussein, officially the main reason for attack on Iraq. After the first Gulf war, disarmament and consequently inspectorate controls of UN have started in Iraq, where they also checked for presence of WMD. Despite the fact, that has American secretary of state Colin Powell in November 2002 presented evaluations of WMD presence in Iraq in front of UN SC, we can ask ourselves a question whether these proofs were genuine and legally obtained. The answer to that question is negative, even the U.S. Congress has eventually declared that Bush’s administration has exaggerated with Saddam Hussein’s terroristic threats and relied on undependable intelligence results (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2014). Despite of negative decision of UN SC about supporting U.S. in invasion in 2003, Bush founded Coalition of the Willing. Numerous analytics, organisations and media interpret the work of intelligence service and political pressure in this case differently. Some advocate legality and sovereignty of intelligence work in that time, others think that the politics dictated their work. CIA Director, George Tenet wrote, that CIA has passed unreliable data that were based on assumptions about WMD to the White house. But White House deliberately overlooked hints and facts that Iraq does not possess WMD, so it falsified that data and falsely presented them to UN SC and the public. That kind of political work show us manipulative and arbitrary work of policy and at the same time it defilements intelligence community and its work in public. obveščevalna dejavnost obveščevalne službe pristojnosti naloge CIA Združene države Amerike ZDA Irak diplomske naloge CIA intelligence service Iraq weapons of mass destruction White house politics influence and misuse  true true false A. Grubar] Slovenski jezik Angleški jezik Diplomsko delo/naloga 2015-06-26 14:20:57 2015-08-24 11:57:29 2022-05-25 03:07:35 2021-05-08 03:44:43 2015 0 [Ljubljana 2015 [Ljubljana 57 str. 0000-00-00 NiDoloceno NiDoloceno NiDoloceno 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 351.746.1(043.2) 2995178 URN:SI:UM:DK:MFHPOA5M UN_Grubar_Ana_2015.pdf UN_Grubar_Ana_2015.pdf 1 E1E8632A940F98DF87D92B4A8A71FDF6 bd2e6a396cec4e35b56de28223dfe5c14a6b6f7d6008e7ddad270216c8f66065 0b37e8af-7c08-11eb-bb7a-00155d0001ca https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=72884 Fakulteta za varnostne vede 0 0 0