20.500.12556/DKUM-48552 PROBLEM VIDEZA KONTINGENCE V FILOZOFIJI DUHA PROBLEM OF THE APPEARANCE OF CONTINGENCY IN PHILOSOPHY OF MIND V diplomski nalogi se ukvarjamo z vprašanjem videza kontingence v primeru aposteriorne identitete duha in telesa. Videz kontingence je prisoten pri propozicijah, ki so aposteriorne identitete. Večina tovrstnih identitet ni spornih, ker lahko brezhibno pojasnimo videz kontingence. Slednja je prisotna, kadar en člen v identiteti referira kontingentno. Pri identiteti mentalnega in fizičnega kontingentno referiranje ne nastopa in je torej videz kontingence težje razložljiv. Dozdevanje kontingentnosti v diplomski nalogi obravnavamo tako, da najprej raziščemo strategijo pojavnih pojmov kot kandidata za razlago. Slednja se izkaže za nevzdržno stališče, ker preozko razume pojavne pojme in predpostavlja to, kar je šele potrebno dokazati. Nadalje se osredotočimo na razlikovanje med teoretičnim in intuitivnim dojetjem nečesa in to podkrepimo z obravnavo Papineaujevega razumevanja Kripkejevega argumenta iz zamisljivosti. Iz te obravnave vidimo, kako se Kripkejev argument razlikuje od dvo-dimenzionalnega (2D) argumenta, ki v sodobni filozofiji velja za verodostojno revizijo Kripkejevega argumenta. Na podlagi tega lahko odgovorimo na izvorni Kripkejev izziv, in sicer tako, da videz kontingence razložimo kot posledico intuicije različnosti. Prikažemo, da je slednja osnovana na miselni zmoti in to razširimo na problem duha in telesa, za katerega tako potem velja, da nima ontološke podlage. We will discuss the problem of the appearance of contingency in the case of aposteriory identity of mind and body. The appearence of contingency is present in propositions that are aposteriory identities. Most such propositions are not problematic because we can explain the appearance of contingency, which is present whenever one of the elements in the identity statement refers contingently. In the case of identity of mental and physical, there is no contingent referring and thus the appearance of contingency is harder to explain. We explore the appearance of contingency with the help of phenomenal concepts strategy as one candidate for explanation. We conclude that this strategy is of no use because it employs a very limited and narrow meaning of phenomenal concepts, and it can also be seen as circular. Instead, we examine another strategy that requires discrimination between theoretical and intuitive understanding. This leads to Papineau's version of Kripke's concievability argument, from which we can see how a modern, Two-dimensional (2D) version of Kripke's argument differs from the original argument. We can now answer Kripke's challenge: the appearance of contingency is a consequence of the intuition of distinctiveness. This intuition is founded upon a fallacy, and we can expand this logic to the broader mind-body problem, from which we conclude that the problem has no ontological basis Problem duha in telesa identiteta duha in telesa videz kontingence argument iz zamisljivosti Kripke dvodimenzionalen (2D) argument. Mind-body problem mind-body identity the appearence of contingency concievability argument Kripke two-dimensional (2D) argument. true true false [A. Lipuš] Slovenski jezik Angleški jezik Diplomsko delo 2015-07-02 09:40:27 2015-10-13 15:10:28 2022-05-25 03:07:49 2021-05-08 03:40:13 2015 0 Maribor 0 0000-00-00 NiDoloceno NiDoloceno NiDoloceno 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 13(043.2) 21533448 URN:SI:UM:DK:XLLJRKYG UN_Lipus_Alen_2015.pdf UN_Lipus_Alen_2015.pdf 1 FA3D4803F01B0E384B3B35510F49DDD0 83c61ab9ccaa0023d53315bf12ac7e3cc7ee92dc743965557622b31151922ef8 44d1ae20-7c07-11eb-bb7a-00155d0001ca https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=73017 Filozofska fakulteta 0 0 0