20.500.12556/DKUM-60176 Directional learning and the provisioning of public goods We consider an environment where players are involved in a public goods game and must decide repeatedly whether to make an individual contribution or not. However, players lack strategically relevant information about the game and about the other players in the population. The resulting behavior of players is completely uncoupled from such information, and the individual strategy adjustment dynamics are driven only by reinforcement feedbacks from each player's own past. We show that the resulting "directional learning" is sufficient to explain cooperative deviations away from the Nash equilibrium. We introduce the concept of k-strong equilibria, which nest both the Nash equilibrium and the Aumann-strong equilibrium as two special cases, and we show that, together with the parameters of the learning model, the maximal k-strength of equilibrium determines the stationary distribution. The provisioning of public goods can be secured even under adverse conditions, as long as players are sufficiently responsive to the changes in their own payoffs and adjust their actions accordingly. Substantial levels of public cooperation can thus be explained without arguments involving selflessness or social preferences, solely on the basis of uncoordinated directional (mis)learning. cooperation public goods directional learning phase transitions physics of social systems kooperacija javne dobrine usmerjeno učenje fazni prehodi fizika socioloških sistemov true true true Angleški jezik Slovenski jezik Članek v reviji 2016-06-09 03:15:51 2017-06-23 10:11:51 2024-05-28 13:11:53 2019-07-11 11:37:50 2015 0 0 str. 1-6 Letn. 5 2015 0000-00-00 Zaloznikova Objavljeno NiDoloceno 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 2045-2322 53 18727432 21181960 10.1038/srep08010 2045-2322 URN:SI:UM:DK:KDH7AQRH Scientific_Reports_2015_Nax,_Perc_Directional_learning_and_the_provisioning_of_public_goods.pdf Scientific_Reports_2015_Nax,_Perc_Directional_learning_and_the_provisioning_of_public_goods.pdf 1 F1B83A71B2B85AC558EE6D927B6633D9 ba7acd06dd28aeb80623a1e478a4ca83bb0329569c1930fc9c9ebb5553f0df3b 49ab5f43-7c0e-11eb-bb7a-00155d0001ca https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=113001 http://www.nature.com/articles/srep08010 1 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=93991 Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko 0 0 0