20.500.12556/DKUM-60178 An evolutionary inspection game with labour unions on small-world networks We study an evolutionary inspection game where agents can chose between working and shirking. The evolutionary process is staged on a small-world network, through which agents compare their incomes and, based on the outcome, decide which strategy to adopt. Moreover, we introduce union members that have certain privileges, of which the extent depends on the bargaining power of the union. We determine how the union affects the overall performance of the firm that employs the agents, and what are its influences on the employees. We find that, depending on its bargaining power, the union has significant leverage to deteriorate the productivity of a firm, and consequently also to lower the long-run benefits of the employees. cooperation public goods inspection unions physics of social systems kooperacija javne dobrine inšpekcija sindikati fizika socioloških sistemov true true true Angleški jezik Slovenski jezik Članek v reviji 2016-06-09 03:15:54 2017-06-23 09:36:38 2024-05-28 13:09:39 2019-07-11 11:37:55 2015 0 0 str. 1-4 Letn. 5 2015 0000-00-00 Zaloznikova Objavljeno NiDoloceno 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 2045-2322 53 18727432 21222152 10.1038/srep08881 2045-2322 URN:SI:UM:DK:FWOJ04NX Scientific_Reports_2015_Kamal_et_al._An_evolutionary_inspection_game_with_labour_unions_on_small-world_networks.pdf Scientific_Reports_2015_Kamal_et_al._An_evolutionary_inspection_game_with_labour_unions_on_small-world_networks.pdf 1 90971BDDABC239AA9D6F95753D913655 27a466dae7d8b12852a1242a068d8d9a8a7d2f04019863a808ab36ba0573aecd 493ff6ac-7c0e-11eb-bb7a-00155d0001ca https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=112987 http://www.nature.com/articles/srep08881 1 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=93993 Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko 0 0 0