20.500.12556/DKUM-60188 Stability of cooperation under image scoring in group interactions Image scoring sustains cooperation in the repeated two-player prisoner's dilemma through indirect reciprocity, even though defection is the uniquely dominant selfish behaviour in the one-shot game. Many real-world dilemma situations, however, firstly, take place in groups and, secondly, lack the necessary transparency to inform subjects reliably of others' individual past actions. Instead, there is revelation of information regarding groups, which allows for "group scoring" but not for image scoring. Here, we study how sensitive the positive results related to image scoring are to information based on group scoring. We combine analytic results and computer simulations to specify the conditions for the emergence of cooperation. We show that under pure group scoring, that is, under the complete absence of image-scoring information, cooperation is unsustainable. Away from this extreme case, however, the necessary degree of image scoring relative to group scoring depends on the population size and is generally very small. We thus conclude that the positive results based on image scoring apply to a much broader range of informational settings that are relevant in the real world than previously assumed. public goods group interactions phase transition social dilemma physics of social systems javne dobrine skupinske interakcije fazni prehod socialna dilema fizika socioloških sistemov true true true Angleški jezik Slovenski jezik Članek v reviji 2016-06-09 03:16:05 2017-06-23 13:05:09 2024-05-28 13:02:46 2019-07-11 11:38:13 2015 0 0 str. 1-7 Letn. 5 2015 0000-00-00 Zaloznikova Objavljeno NiDoloceno 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 2045-2322 53 18727432 21556744 10.1038/srep12145 2045-2322 URN:SI:UM:DK:9PJDZTHH Scientific_Reports_2015_Nax_et_al._Stability_of_cooperation_under_image_scoring_in_group_interactions.pdf Scientific_Reports_2015_Nax_et_al._Stability_of_cooperation_under_image_scoring_in_group_interactions.pdf 1 4277AC19FD3A639119CBE4894C24DFD8 130b24eac47a7f21b62c8cb6a0912b80eaf28e75c63d4295aeaf915eb348c95f 4b588f4c-7c0e-11eb-bb7a-00155d0001ca https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=113048 http://www.nature.com/articles/srep12145 1 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=94003 Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko 0 0 0