20.500.12556/DKUM-60190 Evolution of public cooperation in a monitored society with implicated punishment and within-group enforcement Monitoring with implicated punishment is common in human societies to avert freeriding on common goods. But is it effective in promoting public cooperation? We show that the introduction of monitoring and implicated punishment is indeed effective, as it transforms the public goods game to a coordination game, thus rendering cooperation viable in infinite and finite well-mixed populations. We also show that the addition of within-group enforcement further promotes the evolution of public cooperation. However, although the group size in this context has nonlinear effects on collective action, an intermediate group size is least conductive to cooperative behaviour. This contradicts recent field observations, where an intermediate group size was declared optimal with the conjecture that group-size effects and within-group enforcement are responsible. Our theoretical research thus clarifies key aspects of monitoring with implicated punishment in human societies, and additionally, it reveals fundamental group-size effects that facilitate prosocial collective action. cooperation public goods punishment sustainable development physics of social systems kooperacija javne dobrine kazen vzdržen razvoj fizika socioloških sistemov true true true Angleški jezik Slovenski jezik Članek v reviji 2016-06-09 03:16:08 2017-06-23 10:56:52 2024-05-28 12:58:09 2019-07-11 11:38:17 2015 0 0 str. 1-12 Letn. 5 2015 0000-00-00 Zaloznikova Objavljeno NiDoloceno 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 2045-2322 53 18727432 21772552 10.1038/srep17050 2045-2322 URN:SI:UM:DK:CQHSHZ5C Scientific_Reports_2015_Chen,_Sasaki,_Perc_Evolution_of_public_cooperation_in_a_monitored_society_with_implicated_punishment_and_within-.pdf Scientific_Reports_2015_Chen,_Sasaki,_Perc_Evolution_of_public_cooperation_in_a_monitored_society_with_implicated_punishment_and_within-.pdf 1 51824A75AA882431D86258D833BA509C ee77ee2d0b4f96d63f441f691884dbe631d08b438dc5e9b61c3746504519314a 4a0ac209-7c0e-11eb-bb7a-00155d0001ca https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=113011 http://www.nature.com/articles/srep17050 1 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=94005 Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko 0 0 0