20.500.12556/DKUM-66390 Beyond pairwise strategy updating in the prisoner's dilemma game In spatial games players typically alter their strategy by imitating the most successful or one randomly selected neighbor. Since a single neighbor is taken as reference, the information stemming from other neighbors is neglected, which begets the consideration of alternative, possibly more realistic approaches. Here we show that strategy changes inspired not only by the performance of individual neighbors but rather by entire neighborhoods introduce a qualitatively different evolutionary dynamics that is able to support the stable existence of very small cooperative clusters. This leads to phase diagrams that differ significantly from those obtained by means of pairwise strategy updating. In particular, the survivability of cooperators is possible even by high temptations to defect and over a much wider uncertainty range. We support the simulation results by means of pair approximations and analysis of spatial patterns, which jointly highlight the importance of local information for the resolution of social dilemmas. cooperation social dilemma wisdom of crowds phase transitions physics of social systems kooperacija socialna dilema masovno znanje fazni prehodi fizika socialnih sistemov true true true Angleški jezik Slovenski jezik Članek v reviji 2017-06-23 09:54:09 2017-06-23 09:55:23 2024-05-28 11:28:22 2019-07-11 15:45:52 2012 0 0 str. 1-8 Letn. 2 2012 0000-00-00 Zaloznikova Objavljeno NiDoloceno 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 2045-2322 53 18727432 19449864 10.1038/srep00740 2045-2322 URN:SI:UM:DK:NW4UIBG8 Scientific_Reports_2012_Wang_et_al._Beyond_pairwise_strategy_updating_in_the_prisoner_s_dilemma_game.pdf Scientific_Reports_2012_Wang_et_al._Beyond_pairwise_strategy_updating_in_the_prisoner_s_dilemma_game.pdf 1 04593783E479A95D8394A1452EBE3C6E ad53fbb460bf0e54a30d0fc5d1b408a917bccf18c544280e930f59dc2ff0cca7 496f5f4c-7c0e-11eb-bb7a-00155d0001ca https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=112993 http://www.nature.com/articles/srep00740 1 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=112992 Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko 0 0 0