20.500.12556/DKUM-66407 Optimal interdependence between networks for the evolution of cooperation Recent research has identified interactions between networks as crucial for the outcome of evolutionary games taking place on them. While the consensus is that interdependence does promote cooperation by means of organizational complexity and enhanced reciprocity that is out of reach on isolated networks, we here address the question just how much interdependence there should be. Intuitively, one might assume the more the better. However, we show that in fact only an intermediate density of sufficiently strong interactions between networks warrants an optimal resolution of social dilemmas. This is due to an intricate interplay between the heterogeneity that causes an asymmetric strategy flow because of the additional links between the networks, and the independent formation of cooperative patterns on each individual network. Presented results are robust to variations of the strategy updating rule, the topology of interdependent networks, and the governing social dilemma, thus suggesting a high degree of universality. social dilemma cooperation public goods biased utility interdependent networks statistical physics of social systems socialna dilema kooperacija javne dobrine pristranski donosi soodvisne mreže statistična fizika socioloških sistemov true true true Angleški jezik Slovenski jezik Članek v reviji 2017-06-23 12:13:39 2017-06-23 12:14:39 2024-05-28 10:44:07 2019-07-11 15:46:23 2013 0 0 str. 1-7 Letn. 3 2013 0000-00-00 Zaloznikova Objavljeno NiDoloceno 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 2045-2322 53 18727432 20023048 10.1038/srep02470 2045-2322 URN:SI:UM:DK:OTBP7XKS Scientific_Reports_2013_Wang,_Szolnoki,_Perc_Optimal_interdependence_between_networks_for_the_evolution_of_cooperation.pdf Scientific_Reports_2013_Wang,_Szolnoki,_Perc_Optimal_interdependence_between_networks_for_the_evolution_of_cooperation.pdf 1 9892A3EDA73F5A958A12E5708D73FF90 b48188f6e8d6098aa42f00a5d1ad5c8b90786b04dbd2915d7a7291f3d12633be 4ae15f02-7c0e-11eb-bb7a-00155d0001ca https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=113035 http://www.nature.com/articles/srep02470 1 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=113034 Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko 0 0 0