20.500.12556/DKUM-66534 Coevolution of teaching activity promotes cooperation Evolutionary games are studied where the teaching activity of players can evolve in time. Initially all players following either the cooperative or defecting strategy are distributed on a square lattice. The rate of strategy adoption is determined by the payoff difference and a teaching activity characterizing the donor's capability to enforce its strategy on the opponent. Each successful strategy adoption process is accompanied by an increase in the donor's teaching activity. By applying an optimum value of the increment, this simple mechanism spontaneously creates relevant inhomogeneities in the teaching activities that support the maintenance of cooperation for both the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game. evolutionary game theory prisoner's dilemma spatial games snowdrift game coevolution evolucijska teorija iger dilema zapornika prostorske igre igra sokola in orla koevolucija true true true Angleški jezik Slovenski jezik Članek v reviji 2017-06-30 09:52:11 2017-06-30 09:53:55 2024-05-28 10:22:08 2019-07-11 15:50:40 2008 0 0 str. 1-10 Letn. 10 2008 0000-00-00 Zaloznikova Objavljeno NiDoloceno 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 1367-2630 519.83:53 21135621 12216342 10.1088/1367-2630/10/4/043036 1367-2630 URN:SI:UM:DK:H4C2BAAF New_Journal_of_Physics_2008_Szolnoki,_Perc_Coevolution_of_teaching_activity_promotes_cooperation.pdf New_Journal_of_Physics_2008_Szolnoki,_Perc_Coevolution_of_teaching_activity_promotes_cooperation.pdf 1 AB40BA4E99837DDE77F6F12D2BE270AB ff56858a588d93edd2ac74c54836af498b04362adc80f1dfd3425beee81bfa41 53aee584-7c0e-11eb-bb7a-00155d0001ca https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=113384 http://stacks.iop.org/1367-2630/10/i=4/a=043036?key=crossref.74e8e12998fe6b3ca1d8423dcc0d749b 1 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=113383 Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko 0 0 0