20.500.12556/DKUM-66537 Costly hide and seek pays unexpected consequences of deceit in a social dilemma Deliberate deceptiveness intended to gain an advantage is commonplace in human and animal societies. In a social dilemma, an individual may only pretend to be a cooperator to elicit cooperation from others, while in reality he is a defector. With this as motivation, we study a simple variant of the evolutionary prisonerʼs dilemma game entailing deceitful defectors and conditional cooperators that lifts the veil on the impact of such two-faced behavior. Defectors are able to hide their true intentions at a personal cost, while conditional cooperators are probabilistically successful at identifying defectors and act accordingly. By focusing on the evolutionary outcomes in structured populations, we observe a number of unexpected and counterintuitive phenomena. We show that deceitful behavior may fare better if it is costly, and that a higher success rate of identifying defectors does not necessarily favor cooperative behavior. These results are rooted in the spontaneous emergence of cycling dominance and spatial patterns that give rise to fascinating phase transitions, which in turn reveal the hidden complexity behind the evolution of deception. social dynamics deceit evolutionary games public goods econophysics cooperation socialna dinamika zavajanje evolucijske igre javne dobrine ekonofizika sodelovanje true true true Angleški jezik Slovenski jezik Članek v reviji 2017-06-30 10:18:40 2017-06-30 10:20:09 2024-05-28 10:10:16 2019-07-11 15:50:46 2014 0 0 str. 1-16 Letn. 16 2014 0000-00-00 Zaloznikova Objavljeno NiDoloceno 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 1367-2630 53 21135621 20914440 10.1088/1367-2630/16/11/113003 1367-2630 URN:SI:UM:DK:NJEERQEA New_Journal_of_Physics_2014_Szolnoki,_Perc_Costly_hide_and_seek_pays_unexpected_consequences_of_deceit_in_a_social_dilemma.pdf New_Journal_of_Physics_2014_Szolnoki,_Perc_Costly_hide_and_seek_pays_unexpected_consequences_of_deceit_in_a_social_dilemma.pdf 1 AEEFF6F1207C77F3B4688C63AB1D087F 4258f5b6022559833b1e3b73cc41cccd3c87ca94645f1f55a99be11c85accdc8 53dbd637-7c0e-11eb-bb7a-00155d0001ca https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=113390 http://stacks.iop.org/1367-2630/16/i=11/a=113003?key=crossref.3c637fead0123ee37dc7b048abf5cdb3 1 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=113389 Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko 0 0 0