20.500.12556/DKUM-66561 Self-organization of punishment in structured populations Cooperation is crucial for the remarkable evolutionary success of the human species. Not surprisingly, some individuals are willing to bear additional costs in order to punish defectors. Current models assume that, once set, the fine and cost of punishment do not change over time. Here we show that relaxing this assumption by allowing players to adapt their sanctioning efforts in dependence on the success of cooperation can explain both the spontaneous emergence of punishment and its ability to deter defectors and those unwilling to punish them with globally negligible investments. By means of phase diagrams and the analysis of emerging spatial patterns, we demonstrate that adaptive punishment promotes public cooperation through the invigoration of spatial reciprocity, the prevention of the emergence of cyclic dominance, or the provision of competitive advantages to those that sanction antisocial behavior. The results presented indicate that the process of self-organization significantly elevates the effectiveness of punishment, and they reveal new mechanisms by means of which this fascinating and widespread social behavior could have evolved. cooperation public goods punishment phase transitions physics of social systems kooperacija javne dobrine kazen fazni prehodi fizika socialnih sistemov true true true Angleški jezik Slovenski jezik Članek v reviji 2017-07-03 10:11:13 2017-07-03 10:12:46 2024-05-27 14:32:03 2019-07-11 15:51:33 2012 0 0 str. 1-14 Letn. 14 2012 0000-00-00 Zaloznikova Objavljeno NiDoloceno 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 1367-2630 530.16 21135621 19100424 10.1088/1367-2630/14/4/043013 1367-2630 URN:SI:UM:DK:OO4FJVKM New_Journal_of_Physics_2012_Perc,_Szolnoki_Self-organization_of_punishment_in_structured_populations.pdf New_Journal_of_Physics_2012_Perc,_Szolnoki_Self-organization_of_punishment_in_structured_populations.pdf 1 7EF33E89DCBAABA401CF5AF4E175DDB9 ee8ca29250aecae96c7223f196c0d0d3ae7fd95d40a1b8c14408be8a292a954c 55ab11ca-7c0e-11eb-bb7a-00155d0001ca https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=113459 http://stacks.iop.org/1367-2630/14/i=4/a=043013?key=crossref.13265a554e877ff17c18c05dc3e7b6f8 1 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=113458 Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko 0 0 0