20.500.12556/DKUM-66786 Optimal distribution of incentives for public cooperation in heterogeneous interaction environments In the framework of evolutionary games with institutional reciprocity, limited incentives are at disposal for rewarding cooperators and punishing defectors. In the simplest case, it can be assumed that, depending on their strategies, all players receive equal incentives from the common pool. The question arises, however, what is the optimal distribution of institutional incentives? How should we best reward and punish individuals for cooperation to thrive? We study this problem for the public goods game on a scale-free network. We show that if the synergetic effects of group interactions are weak, the level of cooperation in the population can be maximized simply by adopting the simplest "equal distribution" scheme. If synergetic effects are strong, however, it is best to reward high-degree nodes more than low-degree nodes. These distribution schemes for institutional rewards are independent of payoff normalization. For institutional punishment, however, the same optimization problem is more complex, and its solution depends on whether absolute or degree-normalized payoffs are used. We find that degree-normalized payoffs require high-degree nodes be punished more lenient than low-degree nodes. Conversely, if absolute payoffs count, then high-degree nodes should be punished stronger than low-degree nodes. public cooperation institutional reciprocity scale-free network punishment reward javna kooperacija institucionalna recipročnost scale-free mreža kazen nagrada true true true Angleški jezik Slovenski jezik Članek v reviji 2017-07-10 12:35:45 2017-07-10 12:36:40 2024-05-27 14:25:41 2019-07-11 15:58:53 2014 0 0 str. 1-11 Letn. 8 Jul. 2014 0000-00-00 Zaloznikova Objavljeno NiDoloceno 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 1662-5153 53 20809480 20810760 10.3389/fnbeh.2014.00248 1662-5153 URN:SI:UM:DK:BBBIPIRO Frontiers_in_Behavioral_Neuroscience_2014_Chen,_Perc_Optimal_distribution_of_incentives_for_public_cooperation_in_heterogeneous_interact.pdf Frontiers_in_Behavioral_Neuroscience_2014_Chen,_Perc_Optimal_distribution_of_incentives_for_public_cooperation_in_heterogeneous_interact.pdf 1 EFA429BB312F842336822894C258BD40 1d27ced7356badc48d2a49a8a0838428c0c800b2e5493fa2c2e5bdf44069e0a3 63c2899a-7c0e-11eb-bb7a-00155d0001ca 20.500.12556/dkum/02a0bb38-fbd1-4a17-9e6d-93d60963cbdd https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=113960 http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fnbeh.2014.00248/full 1 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=113959 Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko 0 0 0