20.500.12556/DKUM-67086 Zakoni in protidejstveniki ali filozofija in problem "copyrighta" Razprava obravnava Popperjevo pojasnilo odnosa med zakoni narave in protidejstvenimi pogojniki. Kadar je neka resnična univerzalna posplošitev, pravi zakon narave, tedaj podpira ustrezni protidejstvenik, kadar ni, takrat je protidejstvenik napačen. Ker zakon narave in univerzalna posplošitev nimata enakih logičnih posledic, nimata enake logične moči, pravi argument iz "razlike v podpori". Po kriteriju falsifikacionizma so zakoni narave ovrgljivi. Če je zakon ovrgljiv, potem ne more biti nujen. In če zakon ni nujen, potem ne more podpirati protidejstvenikov. Popper je zato skušal ovreči argument iz razlike v podpori in zakone narave vseeno izraziti kot univerzalne posplošitve. Razlika v podpori zanj izvira iz različne strukture terminov, ki nastopajo v posplošitvi. Izrazi v slučajnih posplošitvah so definirani ekstenzionalno, izrazi v zakonih narave so kvalitativni, oznake za intenzije. S tem je Popper napovedal sodobno teorijo, po kateri je zakon narave zveza intenzij, razumljenih kot univerzalije. Vendar zaradi vztrajanja pri logični obliki univerzalne posplošitve, ki da jo imajo zakoni narave, Popper do prave rešitve nikoli ni prišel. The article discusses Popper's explanation of the relationship between the laws of nature and counterfactuals. When a certain universal generalisation isa true natural law, it supports a suitable counterfactual, and when it is not a natural law, the counterfactual is incorrect. According to the "from difference to support" argument, since a natural law and a universal generalisation do not have the same logical consequences, they are not of equal logical strength. According to the criterion of falsificationism, the laws of nature are refutable. If a law is refutable, it is not mandatory. And if a law is not mandatory, it cannot support counterfactuals. For this reason,Popper attempted to refute the "from difference to support" argument and still formulate natural laws as universal generalisations. He maintains that "from difference to support" is derived from different terminological structures featured in generalisation. Terminology in random generalisations is defined extensively, whilst terminology in natural laws is qualitative and denotes intentions. Popper thus precedes modern theory, according to which a natural law is a structure of intentions understood as being universal. However, because of his insistence on the logical form of universal generalisation as being characteristic of natural laws, Popper never found the proper solution to the problem. filozofija filozofija znanosti znanosti teorije znanosti philosophy philosophy of science sciences science theories true true true Slovenski jezik Angleški jezik Članek v reviji 2017-08-02 08:30:41 2017-08-02 08:33:54 2024-08-06 13:08:22 2019-07-11 16:08:33 1997 0 0 str. 191 št. 186-187 Letn. 25 1997 0000-00-00 Zaloznikova Objavljeno NiDoloceno 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 0351-4285 11:001 672783 6925576 0351-4285 URN:SI:UM:DK:QTUWFG7G Casopis_za_kritiko_znanosti_1997_Suster_Zakoni_in_protidejstveniki_ali_filozofija_in_problem_copyrighta.pdf Casopis_za_kritiko_znanosti_1997_Suster_Zakoni_in_protidejstveniki_ali_filozofija_in_problem_copyrighta.pdf 1 0FE0FC92E8DB175E4D740B49FDAED535 98df3cf56c4f75d22ac57cd1a9c6a37f081a2ac2454dcc0aaba3d672c3b03dfb 760c1a98-7c0e-11eb-bb7a-00155d0001ca 20.500.12556/dkum/05e571fa-9b8d-4ce6-9321-377e0270be67 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=114686 http://www.dlib.si/details/URN:NBN:SI:DOC-XY5PTST0 1 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=114685 Pedagoška fakulteta 0 0 0