20.500.12556/DKUM-67132 Correlation of positive and negative reciprocity fails to confer an evolutionary advantage: phase transitions to elementary strategies Economic experiments reveal that humans value cooperation and fairness. Punishing unfair behavioris therefore common, and according to the theory of strong reciprocity, it is also directly related to rewarding cooperative behavior. However, empirical data fail to confirm that positive and negative reciprocity are correlated. Inspired by this disagreement, we determine whether the combined application of reward and punishment is evolutionarily advantageous. We study a spatial public goods game, where in addition to the three elementary strategies of defection, rewarding, and punishment, a fourth strategy that combines the latter two competes for space. We find rich dynamical behavior that gives rise to intricate phase diagrams where continuous and discontinuous phase transitions occur in succession. Indirect territorial competition, spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance, as well as divergent fluctuations of oscillations that terminate in an absorbing phase are observed. Yet, despite the high complexity of solutions, the combined strategy can survive only in very narrow and unrealistic parameter regions. Elementary strategies, either in pure or mixed phases, are much more common and likely to prevail. Our results highlight the importance of patterns and structure in human cooperation, which should be considered in future experiments. public goods punishment reward evolutionary games collective phenomena phase transitions physics of social systems javne dobrine kazen nagrada evolucijske igre kolektivni pojav fazni prehodi fizika socioloških sistemov true true true Angleški jezik Slovenski jezik Članek v reviji 2017-08-03 10:03:30 2017-08-03 10:04:35 2024-05-27 14:15:46 2019-07-11 16:10:04 2013 0 0 str. 1-11 št. 4 Letn. 3 2013 0000-00-00 Zaloznikova Objavljeno NiDoloceno 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 2160-3308 53 19686152 20216584 10.1103/PhysRevX.3.041021 2160-3308 URN:SI:UM:DK:PUXWECXJ Physical_Review_X_2013_Szolnoki,_Perc_Correlation_of_Positive_and_Negative_Reciprocity_Fails_to_Confer_an_Evolutionary_Advantage_Phase_T.pdf Physical_Review_X_2013_Szolnoki,_Perc_Correlation_of_Positive_and_Negative_Reciprocity_Fails_to_Confer_an_Evolutionary_Advantage_Phase_T.pdf 1 4C457F0C6FEA8C47ED32893C3EE2726B b38a1bc5838905b2ebc9f602a6fd145c7e37940e8b32daf5d367d2295a4a2077 78a2b516-7c0e-11eb-bb7a-00155d0001ca 20.500.12556/dkum/6c3f1894-542e-44bb-a3d4-424fe13acc16 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=114779 https://journals.aps.org/prx/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevX.3.041021 1 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=114778 Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko 0 0 0