20.500.12556/DKUM-68209 Nekateri problemi socialne ontologije Certain problems of social ontology Vsebina magistrskega dela opisuje osnovne principe socialne ontologije po teoriji Johna Searla. Ta teorija izhaja iz naturalizma in pojasnjuje socialne bitnosti, kot posledico naravnih procesov, ki so biološko in fizikalno razložljivi. Osnovni paradoks socialne ontologije je hkratni pojav ontološke subjektivnosti in epistemološke objektivnosti. Searle pojasnjuje, da je tak pojav možen in ne predstavlja paradoksa. Socialna ontologija je po Searlu rezultat jezika oz. govornih dejanj. Z reprezentiranjem socialnih bitnosti kot stvarnih, jih delamo obstoječe. Za nastanek socialnih bitnosti je potrebno pripisovanje statusnih funkcij objektom, ki teh funkcij nimajo. Poleg tega je potrebna kolektivna intencionalnost, ki je temelj družbene stvarnosti. Kolektivne intencionalnosti ni možno pojasnjevati kot seštevek individualnih intencionalnosti, kot menijo metodološki individualisti. Pripisi statusnih funkcij, ki imajo obliko konstitutivnih pravil, so institucionalna dejstva. Statusna funkcija, ki je pripisana objektu, osebi ali dejstvu, temu pripisuje deontične moči. Deontične moči pri članih skupnosti povzročajo razloge za dejanja, ki so neodvisni od subjektivnih nagnenj članov. Na ta način so socialne bitnosti objektivne. V delu so podane tudi kritike in problemi teorije socialne ontologije Johna Searla. Opisanih je pet primerov kritik in problemov: problem ''Ad Hoc'', problem ''prostostoječih Y terminov'', problem institucionalnih dejstev, ki ne potrebujejo kolektivne prepoznave, kritika o drugih vrstah socialnih institucij in kritika o estetskih vplivih v socialni ontologiji. Vsaka predstavljena kritika vsebuje tudi Searlov zagovor. Poleg kritik sta predstavljeni še dve drugi teoriji socialne ontologije. To sta metodološki/ontološki individualizem in teorija skupne zavezanosti. Teorija skupne zavezanosti se v določenih segmentih s Searlom strinja, teorija metodološkega in ontološkega individualizma pa predstavlja nasprotno pozicijo. The content of this master's thesis describes the basic principles of Social Ontology by John Searle’s theory. This theory originates from Naturalism and explains social entities as a consequence of natural processes that are biologically and physically explainable. The basic paradox of Social Ontology is a simultaneous occurrence of ontological subjectivity and epistemological objectivity. Searle explains that such occurrence is possible and does not represent a paradox. Social Ontology by Searle is a result of language or speech acts. With the representation of social entity as realistic, we are making social entity existing. For something to become social entity, the act of attribution of status functions to objects is necessary, since these objects do not have these functions by themselves, as well as collective intentionality. Collective intentionality is the foundation of social entities. It is not possible for collective intentionality to be explained as a sum of individual intentionalities, as are for example the opinions of methodological individualists. Annotations of status functions that take the form of constitutive rules are institutional facts. Status functions that are attributed to an object, person or fact have deontic power. Deontic powers, possessed by members of a community, cause reasons for acts that are independent of subjective inclination of its members. In this way the social entities are objective. In my work I have given critiques and provided problems of the Social Ontology Theory by John Searle. There are five examples of critiques and problems: the “Ad Hoc” problem, the problem of “freestanding Y terms”, the problem of institutional facts that does not require collective recognition, the critique of other types of social institutions and the critique of aesthetic influences in Social Ontology. Each presented critique includes Searle’s defence. Along with critiques, two other theories of Social Ontology are presented. These are Methodological/Ontological Individualism and The Theory of Joint Commitment. The Theory of Joint Commitment agrees with Searle in certain segments, while The Theory of Methodological and Ontological Individualism takes a contrary position. socialna ontologija kolektivna intencionalnost institucionalna dejstva statusne funkcije metodološki individualizem ''prostostoječi'' Y termini Social Ontology Collective Intentionality Institutional Facts Status Function Methodological individualism Freestanding Y Terms true true false [T. Koltai] Slovenski jezik Angleški jezik Magistrsko delo/naloga 2017-09-12 23:11:43 2017-10-25 10:35:01 2022-08-01 15:00:52 2019-07-11 16:45:31 2017 0 Maribor 0 0000-00-00 NiDoloceno NiDoloceno NiDoloceno 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 111.1(043.2) 23415048 URN:SI:UM:DK:3JZ3PF8S MAG_Koltai_Tomaz_2017.pdf MAG_Koltai_Tomaz_2017.pdf 1 CBB8BB1B5320E0EF76CBF76FACA0B277 1d49860c83c08732d84bb5ac8b726cd7aad5ebc4414f7efa700051beb1958223 3e9e49ff-7c0f-11eb-bb7a-00155d0001ca 20.500.12556/dkum/91f16148-1ed5-4a55-b884-b36bdd2693be https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=117858 Filozofska fakulteta 0 0 0