20.500.12556/DKUM-70348 The indifferent, the good Samaritan, the brave and the agent in Allais paradox situation or how endowment effect influences our decision in case of Allais paradox? Indiferentni, dobri samaritan, hrabri in agent v položaju Allais-ovega paradoksa kako učinek lastništva vpliva na našo odločitev v primeru Allais-ovega paradoksa? Background and purpose: Mainstream economic models do not take ownership into consideration. Only after the findings of behavioural economists was endowment effect widely observed. Endowment effect means that goods that one owns are valued higher than other goods not held in endowment. At the same time the principal-agent literature is concerned with how the principal (such as employer) can motivate his agent (say the employee), to act in the principal’s interests and also for their holdings. The main problem is that acting in somebody’s else’s interests can influence our values as well. Moreover, the principal as owner suffers from endowment effect. Both situations can be treated as a risky decision. Risk confuses our rationality in a predictable way. Design/Methodology/Approach: Due to this it was observed how foreign students from various cultural backgrounds decided (n=186 answers) in a risky financial situation by focusing on Allais’ classic gambles. I also presented their preferences over certain and uncertain outcomes regarding the owner of the final win; i.e. how they choose for themselves or on behalf of one of their best friends. One famous experiment - which tested the descriptive validity of the axioms’ expected utility theory - was Allais. Allais handled probabilities and outcomes in high hypothetical payoff financial gamble situations; he found that when offering two similar options, the common consequences will not be removed by the actors. I was interested in what happens when the actors take risks on behalf of others. It was used between-subjects technique on an extended multicultural sample. Regarding the two different topics, three hypotheses were tested (1); based on Allais paradox (2); observed ownerships (3); the comparison of two phenomena. Results: The results show that the subjects responded differently when they needed to decide about their own properties rather when their friends’ properties were concerned. When a sure safe outcome was offered to the subjects, they took more risk on behalf of their friends rather than own. Moreover, the subjects do not take into consideration that the same attributes must be ignored, so Allais paradox was verified. Conclusion: The goal of this paper is then twofold. First, it was established a conceptual link between Allais-type behaviour and ownership problem. Second, Allais axiom was used to characterize different roles. Knowing predictable patterns of seemingly irrational heuristics in human behaviour can improve economic theory. At the same time, this knowledge helps us to avoid irrational decisions. Ozadje in namen: Glavni ekonomski modeli ne upoštevajo lastništva, čeprav učinek lastništva kažejo ugotovitve vedenjskih ekonomistov. Ta učinek pomeni, da je blago, ki ga nekdo ima v lasti, vrednoteno višje od drugega blaga, ki ni v njegovi ali njeni posesti. Obenem se literatura glavnega agenta ukvarja s tem, kako lahko glavni agent (kot je n.pr. delodajalec) motivira svojega agenta (recimo delavca), da deluje tudi v interesu glavnega agenta. Poglavitni problem je, da lahko delovanje v interesu nekega drugega vpliva tudi na naše vrednote. Poleg tega učinek lastništva vpliva tudi na glavnega agenta. Obe situaciji je mogoče obravnavati kot tvegano odločitev. Tveganje namreč zmede našo racionalnost na predvidljiv način. Oblikovanje / metodologija / pristop: V članku raziskujem, kako so se študentje (n = 186 odgovorov) iz različnih kulturnih okolij odločali v tveganem finančnem položaju, s posebnim ozirom na klasične Allais-ove igre. Predstavila sem tudi njihove preference glede gotovih in negotovih izidov upoštevajoč lastnika končnih izidov; to je, kako se odločijo, ko se odločajo za sebe ali za enega od svojih najboljših prijateljev. Eden od znanih eksperimentov, ki so te­stirali veljavnost pričakovane uporabne teorije aksiomov, je bil Allais-ov eksperiment. Allais je obravnaval verjetnosti in izide v izrazito hipotetičnih situacijah v finančnih igrah. Zanima me, kaj se zgodi, ko udeleženci tvegajo v imenu drugih. Uporabljena je bila tehnika med subjekti na razširjenem večkulturnem vzorcu. V zvezi z dvema različnima temama smo testirali tri hipoteze (1) prva temelji na Allais-ovem paradoksu, (2) druga na percipiranem lastništvu in (3) na primerjavi obeh pojavov. Rezultati: Rezultati kažejo, da so se subjekti drugače odzvali, ko so se morali odločiti o svoji lastnini, kot takrat, ko so odločali o lastnini drugih. Ko je bil subjektom ponujen tudi varen izid, so sprejemali večje tveganje v imenu svojih prijateljev, kot v svojem imenu. Subjekti niso upoštevali, da bi morali prezreti lastništvo. Tako je bil potrjen Allais-ov paradoks. Zaključek: V članku je bila vzpostavljena je bila konceptualna povezava med vedenjem vrste Allais in problemom lastništva. Drugič, Allais-ov aksiom je bil uporabljen za označevanje različnih vlog. Poznavanje predvidljivih vzorcev navidezno iracionalne hevristike v človeškem vedenju lahko izboljša ekonomsko teorijo. Hkrati to znanje nam poma­ga preprečiti neracionalne odločitve. Allais paradox endowment effect principal-agent problem risk Allaisov paradoks učinek lastništva problem glavnega agenta tveganje true false true Angleški jezik Slovenski jezik Znanstveno delo 2018-05-04 14:23:41 2018-05-04 14:26:01 2023-07-24 13:30:50 2019-07-11 18:04:10 2017 0 0 str. 299-313 št. 4 Letn. 50 0000-00-00 Zaloznikova Objavljeno NiDoloceno 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 1581-1832 251341568 298459904 10.1515/orga-2017-0022 1581-1832 URN:SI:UM:DK:76YMLGNP Organizacija_2017_Kolnhofer-Derecskei_The_Indifferent,_the_Good_Samaritan,_the_Brave_and_the_Agent_in_Allais_Paradox_situation_–_or_How.pdf Organizacija_2017_Kolnhofer-Derecskei_The_Indifferent,_the_Good_Samaritan,_the_Brave_and_the_Agent_in_Allais_Paradox_situation_–_or_How.pdf 1 C28393505AC2EBA489EDCD8321509FAD 5bd67cf5ea67819c9508702e97d8d16c536c73b3711e94acdc8ba30c14068a5f edc49763-7c0f-11eb-bb7a-00155d0001ca 20.500.12556/dkum/fe37185c-b44d-4362-bf5a-8fa892a2ea07 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=124335 https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/orga.2017.50.issue-4/orga-2017-0022/orga-2017-0022.xml 1 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=124334 Fakulteta za organizacijske vede Organizacija 0 0 0