20.500.12556/DKUM-74788 Trdi inkompatibilizem, svoboda in moralna odgovornost Hard incompatibilism, free will and moral responsibility Cilja magistrske naloge sta predvsem dva: prvič, dokazati pravilnost stališča trdega inkompatibilizma in, drugič, ga braniti pred glavnimi očitki/ugovori. Prvi cilj se poskuša doseči tako, da se (predvsem) preko Pereboomovega argumenta iz štirih primerov pokaže, da sta obe nasprotni stališči v filozofiji svobode, ki zagovarjata obstoj svobode in moralne odgovornosti v klasičnem smislu (kompatibilizem in libertarizem), neprepričljivi in izredno problematični. Kar se pa tiče drugega cilja, pa se poskuša pokazati, da so vsi ti očitki/ugovori trdemu inkompatibilizmu, ki izpostavljajo predvsem to, kakšne grozne praktične posledice naj bi sledile za naša življenja, v kolikor sprejmemo njegovo resničnost (med drugim bi naj izgubili kakršnokoli moralno odgovornost), nekorektni in da torej resničnost trdega inkompatibilizma ne prinaša prav nobene bojazni. The objectives of the Master's thesis are mainly two: firstly, to demonstrate the correctness of the position of hard incompatibilism and, secondly, to defend it against major objections. The first objective is achieved by showing (in particular) through the Pereboom’s four-case argument that the two main opposite positions in the philosophy of free will, which advocate the existence of free will and moral responsibility in the classical sense (compatibilism and libertarianism), are unconvincing and highly problematic. As for the second goal, it’s shown that all these allegations/objections against hard incompatibilism that stress out all the horrible practical consequences for our lives (among other things, loss of any kind of moral responsibility), insofar as we accept its reality, are incorrect, and that therefore our lives can remain mostly the same. svoboda moralna odgovornost determinizem argument iz štirih primerov trdi inkompatibilizem free will moral responsibility determinism four-case argument hard incompatibilism true true false [T. Koprivnik] Slovenski jezik Angleški jezik Magistrsko delo/naloga 2019-09-06 14:53:24 2019-10-28 13:55:27 2022-08-09 09:33:24 2019-12-10 08:11:26 2019 0 Maribor 0 0000-00-00 NiDoloceno NiDoloceno NiDoloceno 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 17:123(043.2) 24810760 URN:SI:UM:DK:TVJJKAO9 MAG_Koprivnik_Tim_2019.pdf MAG_Koprivnik_Tim_2019.pdf 1 2D13FE127764D38511A5F0E21D793CF3 c8a964da987838e08fd50f80488fb1187712c4ed24c5713773961276263253f6 ea09ea90-7c10-11eb-bb7a-00155d0001ca 20.500.12556/dkum/70d85290-2f86-4a28-9d23-d742bfe6e04b https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=137356 Filozofska fakulteta 0 0 0