20.500.12556/DKUM-75176 Vpliv jamstvenih shem na večanje možnosti moralnega tveganja v bankah The impact of guarantee schemes on potential increasing of moral hazard in banks Finančna in gospodarska kriza leta 2007/2008 je pokazala velik problem v bančnem sektorju. Takrat so se vzpostavile sheme za jamstvo vlog kot rešitev iz krize in ponovno zaupanje vlagateljev v finančni sistem. Enotni sistem jamstva vloga na ravni EU bi se naj postopoma vzpostavil do leta 2024. zajamčene sheme pa imajo na nacioalni ravni zagotovljen znesek 100.000 evrov na vlagatelja. Največji krivec za pojav moralnega tveganja so zavarovanja, vendar še do vzpostavite shem za jamstvo vlog ni bilo govora o zmanjšanju in omejitvah le tega. V diplomskem projektu odgovarjamo na vprašanje ali jamsvene sheme povečujejo moralno tveganje v bančništvu. Evropski sistem jamstva za vloge sicer zajema sklop močnih varoval proti moralnemu tveganju. Večji nadzor v bankah in poostrene naloge nadzornikov bodo tako tudi pripomogle k omejitvi moralnega tveganja. Moralno tveganje smo obravnavali v svojem poglavju saj nas je zanimalo kaj to je in primer moralnega tveganja ki se hitro kaže v zavarovalništvu, poznamo tudi vrste moralnega tveganja. Na področju Slovenije je bil vzpostavljen zakon o jamstveni shemi in sklad za jamstvo vlog, v sklad prispevajo vse banke in hranilnice s sedežem v Republiki Sloveniji, iz sklada se financirajo sredstva ki so potrebna za propadle banke oziroma za banke ki niso sposobne izplačati posojil vlagateljem. Skladi bodo počasi poenosteni v vseh državah EU. The financial and economic crisis in the years 2007 and 2008 warned about a big problem in the financial sector. Then, the deposit guarantee schemes were established as a solution to the crisis and to restore the trust of investors in the financial system. A unified deposit guarantee system on the level of the EU should be established gradually until 2024. Guaranteed schemes mean a guaranteed amount of 100,000 euros per investor on the national level. The greatest culprit for the emergence of moral risk is insurances. Until the establishment of the deposit guarantee schemes, however, there was no discussion about the reduction or limitation of them. In the bachelor’s thesis, we answer the question of whether guaranteed schemes increase moral risk in the banking sector. The European deposit guarantee system includes a system of strong safeguards against moral risk. Greater control in banks and tighter control of the supervisors will thus contribute to the limitation of moral risk. We discussed moral risk in an individual chapter because we were interested in what this is. The case of moral risk is evident in the insurance business. We also know the types of moral risk. In the area of Slovenia, the Guarantee Fund of the Republic of Slovenia Act was adopted and the fund for deposit guarantees was established. All the banks and savings banks registered in the Republic of Slovenia contribute to the fund. Assets which are necessary for the bankrupted banks or for the banks which are incapable of paying out the loans to the investors are financed from the fund. The funds will be slowly unified in all the EU member states. Zakon o jamstvenih shemi Republike Slovenije finančna kriza bančni sektor depozitne jamstvene sheme nadzor nad moralnim tveganjem Refublic of Slovenija Guarantee Scheme Act financial crisis banking sector deposit guarantee schemes the control of Moral Hazard true true false V. Kašnik Slovenski jezik Angleški jezik Delo diplomskega projekta/projektno delo 2019-09-25 22:16:50 2021-10-29 09:06:29 2022-08-09 10:04:08 2019-10-10 03:22:01 2021 0 [Maribor 0 0000-00-00 NiDoloceno NiDoloceno NiDoloceno 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 336.71 82840067 URN:SI:UM:DK:6JOAMCR7 VS_Kasnik_Vesna_2021.pdf VS_Kasnik_Vesna_2021.pdf 1 B87A751190C2DC3DFF300A2C313EA378 f24ffe265ccf5afe70ff03c16f24e691cca99161393ba2eb9dc3ba41a74c81ec e68a6379-2504-11ec-b78e-00155d000105 20.500.12556/dkum/ee7725e5-8f6a-40a7-b172-829ae2fa0d3c https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=154790 Ekonomsko-poslovna fakulteta 0 0 0