20.500.12556/DKUM-77776 Iluzija zavesti: metaanaliza problema duha in telesa The Illusion of Consciousness: Meta-Analysis of the Mind-Body Problem Disertacija najprej predstavi osrednji problem v sodobni filozofiji duha, tj. problem pojavne zavesti. Izpostavi situacijo, da je zaradi nejasnosti uporabljenih pojmov problem težavno opredeliti. Nato podrobneje predstavi ključne pojme, ki problem sestavljajo, in poda analizo sodobne dialektične situacije v filozofiji duha glede problema pojavne zavesti. Kasneje obravnava tradicionalne opredelitve problema in posledične rešitve ter jih predstavi kot nezadostne rešitve. Nato se osredotoči na metapristop, za katerega je značilno kritično preiskovanje predpostavk. Metaanaliza problema zavesti je najboljši pristop za razumevanje legitimnosti problema pojavne zavesti in za ovrednotenje posameznih stališč, ki so se do zdaj oblikovala kot reakcije na problem. To, da je vprašanje o umestitvi zavesti v svet smiselno, predpostavlja, da je zavest neka stvar iste kategorije kot razsežni predmeti; predpostavlja, da je zavest točno takšna, kot se nam kaže, saj je ravno videz zavesti tisti, zaradi katerega jo je težavno umestiti v svet; predpostavlja, da glede na zavest, razlikovanje med realnostjo in videzom ne obstaja. V metaanalizi disertacija te predpostavke artikulira in ovrednoti, kakšne so posledice njihovega sprejetja. Disertacija pokaže, da so nekatere predpostavke (npr. predpostavka o identiteti videza in realnosti zavesti) takšne, da njihovo nekritično sprejemanje pomeni prevelik teoretski davek in smo tako primorani, da jih v raziskovanju ne dojemamo kot aksiomatskih oz. samoumevnih izhodišč. Disertacija prav tako predstavi iluzionizem kot enega izmed metapristopov k reševanju problema pojavne zavesti in predlaga, da je to najboljša strategija za fizikaliste, tj. pripadnike stališča, da so mentalna stanja v bistvu fizična. Disertacija nato predstavi in obravnava iluzionizem kot fizikalistično teorijo zavesti. Obravnava proces vzpostavitve iluzionizma in predstavi sklepanje, ki običajno vodi do iluzionizma: opiše in kritično ovrednoti prvotne vzpostavitvene pogoje za iluzionizem ter pokaže, da je v trenutni literaturi iluzionizem vzpostavljen na problematičen način in kot tak neskladno stališče. Nadalje obravnava razne kritike iluzionizma in nanje odgovori ter predstavi nov problem, zaradi katerega se zdi, da iluzionizem ni skladno vzpostavljen. Na koncu opiše teoretske prednosti uspešne rešitve novega problema – največja je ta, da bi z uspešnim odgovorom na nov problem, iluzionizem postal skladna teorija –, ki sestojijo v tem, da lahko to pripomore pri dodatni obrambi iluzionizma pred drugimi, že obstoječimi kritikami. The dissertation first presents a central problem in contemporary philosophy of mind, i.e. the problem of phenomenal consciousness, and highlights that, due to the ambiguity of the terms used, the problem is difficult to define. Then it presents the key concepts that constitute the problem of consciousness and provides an analysis of the contemporary dialectical situation regarding the problem of consciousness, followed by a discussion of traditional solutions to the problem, which are presented as insufficient. Afterwards, the focus is on the meta-approach, for which a critical investigation of the underlying assumptions is characteristic. A meta-analysis of the problem of consciousness is the best approach for understanding the soundness of the problem of phenomenal consciousness and for evaluating individual positions that have so far been formed as reactions to the problem. In order for the question of the placement of consciousness in the world to make sense, it has to be presupposed that consciousness is stuff of the same type as other extended things; it also has to be presupposed that consciousness is exactly as it seems to us, for it is precisely the appearance of consciousness that makes it difficult to place in the world; and it has to be presupposes that there is no distinction between appearance and reality when it comes to consciousness. In the meta-analysis, the dissertation articulates these presuppositions and evaluates the consequences of accepting or denying them. The dissertation shows that some presuppositions (e.g. the presupposition of identity of appearance and reality of consciousness) are such that accepting them uncritically results in a ‘theoretical tax’ that is too high, and thus we must not perceive them as axiomatic, self-evident starting points in research. The dissertation also justifies illusionism as one of the meta-approaches to solving the problem of phenomenal consciousness, and suggests that it is the best strategy for physicists, i.e. adherents of the view that mental states are essentially physical. The dissertation then presents and treats illusionism as a physicalist theory of consciousness. It critically examines the process of establishing illusionism and presents the reasoning that usually leads to it: it describes and critically evaluates the original establishing conditions for illusionism and shows that, in the current literature, illusionism is established in a problematic way and as is thus an incoherent position. The dissertation further considers various critiques of illusionism, addresses them, and presents a new problem, which suggests that illusionism is not established coherently. Finally, the theoretical advantages of successfully solving this new problem are described – most notably, by successfully solving the new problem illusionism can become a coherent theory –, which can also help in defending illusionism against other, already established critiques. zavest iluzionizem pojavnost takšnosti težek problem zavesti consciousness illusionism phenomenality qualia hard problem of consciousness true true false A. Lipuš] Slovenski jezik Angleški jezik Doktorska disertacija 2020-09-14 18:41:47 2020-11-20 10:21:54 2022-08-09 17:11:19 2020-11-21 03:36:11 2020 0 [Maribor 0 0000-00-00 NiDoloceno NiDoloceno NiDoloceno 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 165.812(043.3) 38381571 URN:SI:UM:DK:MW1M4Q5M DOK_Lipus_Alen_2020.pdf DOK_Lipus_Alen_2020.pdf 1 795AA8E6818DE180DE58C61830F4B317 b5b860c42edc459981bd25c4a982ff365d22060a473adc9d159268fd3a9746c1 ff69be58-7c11-11eb-bb7a-00155d0001ca 20.500.12556/dkum/4f300a2d-3775-4110-8884-b563ade2004f https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=147516 Filozofska fakulteta 0 0 0