20.500.12556/DKUM-87520 Bayesians still don’t learn from conditionals One of the open questions in Bayesian epistemology is how to rationally learn from indicative conditionals (Douven, 2016). Eva et al. (Mind 129(514):461–508, 2020) propose a strategy to resolve this question. They claim that their strategy provides a “uniquely rational response to any given learning scenario”. We show that their updating strategy is neither very general nor always rational. Even worse, we generalize their strategy and show that it still fails. Bad news for the Bayesians. beliefs belief updating conditionals formal epistemology prepričanja posodabljanje prepričanj pogojni stavki formalna epistemologija true true true Springer Nature Angleški jezik Slovenski jezik Članek v reviji 2024-03-19 13:55:55 2024-03-19 14:21:11 2024-03-20 13:22:35 0000-00-00 00:00:00 2023 0 0 Str. 439-451 Št. 3 Letn. 38 2023 0000-00-00 Zaloznikova Objavljeno NiDoloceno 2021-12-13 2022-08-29 2023-09-19 165.8 128533251 10.1007/s12136-022-00527-y 0353-5150 Gunther-2023-Bayesians_Still_Don_t_Learn_from.pdf Gunther-2023-Bayesians_Still_Don_t_Learn_from.pdf 1 23884130F44C36FB168977AD88022257 1b243bc5791e987bcfd4ec1df031cde869ec46ed3a205cfe782a0d3b4f02c755 c904192f-e5f1-11ee-8d81-00155d000105 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=177087 https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-022-00527-y 0 0769b979-e5f0-11ee-8d81-00155d000105 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=177085 Filozofska fakulteta 0 0 0