20.500.12556/DKUM-90128 Dissimilarity-driven behavior and cooperation in the spatial public goods game In this paper, we explore the impact of four different types of dissimilarity-driven behavior on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game. While it is commonly assumed that individuals adapt their strategy by imitating one of their more successful neighbors, in reality only very few will be awarded the highest payoffs. Many have equity or equality preferences, and they have to make do with an average or even with a low payoff. To account for this, we divide the population into two categories. One consists of payoff-driven players, while the other consists of dissimilarity-driven players. The later imitate the minority strategy in their group based on four different dissimilaritydriven behaviors. The rule that most effectively promotes cooperation, and this regardless of the multiplication factor of the public goods game, is when individuals adopt the minority strategy only when their payoff is better than that of their neighbors. If the dissimilarity-driven players adopt the minority strategy regardless of the payoffs of others, or if their payoff is the same, the population typically evolves towards a neutral state where cooperators and defectors are equally common. This may be beneficial when the multiplication factor is low, when defectors would otherwise dominate. However, if the dissimilarity-driven players adopt the minority strategy only when their payoff is worse than that of their neighbors, then cooperation is not promoted at all in comparison to the baseline case in the absence of dissimilarity-driven behavior. We explore the pattern formation behind these results, and we discuss their wider implications for the better understanding of cooperative behavior in social groups. theoretical biology evolution agent-based modeling complex system network science evolutionary game theory teoretična biologija evolucija agentske simulacije kompleksni sistem omrežna znanost evolucijska teorija iger true false true Angleški jezik Slovenski jezik Znanstveno delo 2024-08-23 04:13:04 2025-02-26 10:26:05 2025-02-27 03:11:28 0000-00-00 00:00:00 2019 0 0 str. 1-9 št. članka 7655 Letn. 9 2019 0000-00-00 Zaloznikova Objavljeno apc 2019-02-13 2019-05-09 2019-05-21 53 24609544 10.1038/s41598-019-44184-5 2045-2322 RAZ_Fang_Yinhai_2019.pdf RAZ_Fang_Yinhai_2019.pdf 1 AFB98FD2144313193BB13F0C0224DE1F 12abd85b29a576c7de736a52ed3d5130e920b8b5d5e01969335edf073f3d547b a11a90f9-f423-11ef-a5fa-00155d000105 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=188840 https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-44184-5 0 aaa29f29-f423-11ef-a5fa-00155d000105 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=188841 Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko 0 0 0