20.500.12556/DKUM-91118 The self-organizing impact of averaged payoffs on the evolution of cooperation According to the fundamental principle of evolutionary game theory, the more successful strategy in a population should spread. Hence, during a strategy imitation process a player compares its payoff value to the payoff value held by a competing strategy. But this information is not always accurate. To avoid ambiguity a learner may therefore decide to collect a more reliable statistics by averaging the payoff values of its opponents in the neighborhood, and makes a decision afterwards. This simple alteration of the standard microscopic protocol significantly improves the cooperation level in a population. Furthermore, the positive impact can be strengthened by increasing the role of the environment and the size of the evaluation circle. The mechanism that explains this improvement is based on a self-organizing process which reveals the detrimental consequence of defector aggregation that remains partly hidden during face-to-face comparisons. Notably, the reported phenomenon is not limited to lattice populations but remains valid also for systems described by irregular interaction networks. evolutionary game theory cooperation learning social physics evolucijska teorija iger sodelovanje učenje fizika družbe true false true Angleški jezik Slovenski jezik Znanstveno delo 2024-11-08 03:07:16 2025-03-03 10:45:58 2025-03-04 03:11:39 0000-00-00 00:00:00 2021 0 0 str. 1-11 št. 6 Letn. 23 Jun. 2021 0000-00-00 Zaloznikova Objavljeno NiDoloceno 2021-05-02 2021-06-02 2021-06-24 53 72042755 10.1088/1367-2630/ac0756 1367-2630 RAZ_Szolnoki_Attila_2021.pdf RAZ_Szolnoki_Attila_2021.pdf 1 5BE6A1351F3BF39724EDAB049D0BFAE4 3ff3d0385cda5c47e278974c26a8746b2af40914e823300931562d98d9c52526 06be4fa7-f814-11ef-aa8e-00155d000105 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=188936 https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1367-2630/ac0756 0 47835254-f814-11ef-aa8e-00155d000105 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=188937 Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko 0 0 0