20.500.12556/DKUM-91310 Arguing about free will Lewis and the consequence argument I explore some issues in the logics and dialectics of practical modalities connected with the Consequence Argument (CA) considered as the best argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. According to Lewis (1981) in one of the possible senses of (in)ability, the argument is not valid; however, understood in the other of its possible senses, the argument is not sound. This verdict is based on the assessment of the modal version of the argument, where the crucial notion is power necessity (“no choice” operator), while Lewis analyses the version where the central notion is the locution “cannot render false.”Lewis accepts closure of the relevant (in)ability operator under entailment but not closure under implication. His strategy has a seemingly strange corollary: a free predetermined agent is able (in a strong, causal sense) to falsity the conjunction of history and law. I compare a Moorean position with respect to radical skepticism and knowledge closure with ability closure and propose to explain Lewis’s strategy in the framework of his Moorean stance. consequence arguments ability closures inability closures compatibilism ability inability closure radical scepticism Moorean stance argumenti iz posledic logika sposobnosti kompatibilizem sposobnost nezmožnost zaprtost radikalni skepticizem Mooreova drža true false true Kruzak Angleški jezik Slovenski jezik Znanstveno delo 2024-12-11 09:27:19 2024-12-11 10:01:00 2024-12-12 03:11:21 0000-00-00 00:00:00 2021 0 0 str. 375-403 št. 63 Letn. 21 2021 0000-00-00 Zaloznikova Objavljeno NiDoloceno 2021-06-06 2021-11-15 2021-12-27 141.5:16 91994371 10.52685/cjp.21.63.2 1333-1108 Suster-2021-Arguing_about_Free_Will__Lewis_and.pdf Suster-2021-Arguing_about_Free_Will__Lewis_and.pdf 1 D5E3A58750D84BDEE5934D0236E3251C bff782e97bdca4c2e7e8e7b1243f6953187058761c916d27f29a372523166fcb 4da9c682-b79e-11ef-9f55-00155d000105 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=187266 https://doi.org/10.52685/cjp.21.63.2 0 59e6b430-b79e-11ef-9f55-00155d000105 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=187267 Filozofska fakulteta 0 0 0