20.500.12556/DKUM-93116 Racionalnost navidez neracionalnih družbenih pojavov: teorije zarote ter lažne informacije magistrsko delo The rationality of seemingly irrational social phenomena: conspiracy theories and misinformation Magistrsko delo se ukvarja z vprašanjem, ali so ljudje resnično tako lahkoverni, da množično verjamejo v razne dezinformacije in teorije zarote. Na podlagi analize sekundarnih virov in sinteze obstoječe teorije ugotavljamo, da očitki o preveliki lahkovernosti in naivnosti niso povsem upravičeni. Dezinformacije in teorije zarote običajno niso vzrok za družbene probleme, temveč predvsem njihova posledica. Ljudje imajo dobro razvite kognitivne mehanizme, ki jim pomagajo pri vrednotenju informacij. Ne verjamejo slepo, ampak najprej ocenijo, ali so nove informacije skladne z njihovim predznanjem. Za spremembo mnenja potrebujejo dobre argumente, ocenijo tudi kompetentnost tistega, ki jim informacije sporoča. Preden nekomu verjamejo, se želijo prepričati o tem, ali so interesi osebe, ki jim nekaj sporoča, usklajeni z njihovimi lastnimi. Raziskave, ki kažejo na široko razširjene teorije zarote in lažne novice, imajo metodološke in teoretske pomanjkljivosti. Tam, kjer pa se teorije zarote in dezinformacije resnično pojavljalo, to ni zaradi motenj v kogniciji. Pogosto ima vera v njih v ozadju socialni cilj, ki ga želi posameznik doseči. Zarote se pojavljajo tam, kjer vladata strah in negotovost. Bolj verjetno je, da bodo ljudje verjeli v zarote, ki se nanašajo na akterje, ki jim že od prej ne zaupajo. Pomemben ščit pred teorijami zarote predstavlja demokracija ter močne institucije. This master's thesis deals with the question whether people are really so gullible that they believe in various pieces of misinformation and conspiracy theories en masse. Based on an analysis of secondary sources and a synthesis of existing theory, we conclude that accusations of excessive gullibility and naivety are not entirely justified. Disinformation and conspiracy theories are not usually the cause of social problems, but rather their consequence. People have well-developed cognitive mechanisms that help them evaluate information. They do not believe blindly, but first assess whether new information is consistent with their prior beliefs. They need good arguments to change their minds, and they also assess the competence of the person communicating the information to them. Before believing someone, they want to make sure that the interests of the person communicating something to them are aligned with their own. Research pointing to widespread conspiracy theories and fake news has methodological and theoretical shortcomings. Where conspiracy theories and disinformation do occur, it is not because of cognitive impairments. Often, belief in them helps individuals achieve a social goal. Conspiracies arise where fear and uncertainty prevail. People are more likely to believe in conspiracies involving individuals and groups they already distrust. Democracy and strong institutions are an important shield against conspiracy theories. teorije zarote dezinformacije teorija racionalne izbire lahkovernost conspiracy theories misinformation rational choice theory gullibility true true false Ž. Rotovnik Slovenski jezik Angleški jezik Magistrsko delo/naloga 2025-06-07 09:54:52 2025-09-11 13:24:11 2025-09-12 03:33:01 0000-00-00 00:00:00 2025 0 Maribor 0 Maribor 1 spletni vir (1 datoteka PDF (IX, 91 str.)) 0000-00-00 NiDoloceno NiDoloceno NiDoloceno 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 316.74:316.658.4(043.2) 248612867 MAG_Rotovnik_Ziga_2025.pdf MAG_Rotovnik_Ziga_2025.pdf 1 7C614C3EA8C2404F4E5A6D3FFAA6EDBB 22345ab2c7e16fd18cfbbbe266202684553daeb81a5dc8810b6e215b971e8ed3 a30c4e4b-46ab-11f0-b893-00155d000105 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=192087 Filozofska fakulteta 0 0 0