20.500.12556/DKUM-97653 Effects of stochastic games on evolutionary dynamics in structured populations Continuously changing environments have a paramount role in the evolution of cooperative behavior. Previous works have shown that the transitions among different games, as the feedback between behaviors and environments, can promote cooperative behavior significantly. Quantitative analysis, however, is limited to homogeneous populations, while realistic populations in nature are often more complex and highly heterogeneous. We hereby provide an analytical treatment of when the evolution of cooperation can be supported in stochastic games, applying to arbitrary spatial heterogeneity and payoff structure. We highlight that the rule and frequency of game changes can have surprisingly diverse effects on evolutionary outcomes, depending on the governing social dilemmas. While stochastic games favor the evolution of cooperation in donation games, this is not the case for public goods games and snowdrift games. Hence, our framework and model results offer a more subtle insight into the long-standing enigma. cooperation evolutionary game theory stochastic processes complex networks social physics sodelovanje evolucijska teorija iger stohastični procesi kompleksna omrežja fizika družbe true false true Springer Nature Angleški jezik Slovenski jezik Neznano 2026-03-30 08:57:03 2026-03-30 08:57:04 2026-03-31 03:12:45 0000-00-00 00:00:00 2026 0 0 11 str. št. članka 101 Letn. 9 2026 0000-00-00 Zaloznikova NiDoloceno NiDoloceno 0000-00-00 2026-01-29 2026-03-19 530:519.83 273482243 10.1038/s42005-026-02536-4 2399-3650 RAZ_Zhang_Yuji_2026.pdf RAZ_Zhang_Yuji_2026.pdf 1 4345022ACCBEB67CC187721DB84FC280 588aae9fe0cd04c7393118a7d0f100305ef382df267c168ed539487bd322b151 fbe9ec0d-2c05-11f1-b04b-00155d0001a1 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=204883 https://doi.org/10.1038/s42005-026-02536-4 1 a9d3098c-2c05-11f1-b04b-00155d0001a1 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=204882 Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko 0 0 0