| Naslov: | Van Gulick's solution of the exclusion problem revisited |
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| Avtorji: | ID Bregant, Janez (Avtor) |
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| Datoteke: |  http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-004-1014-7
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| Jezik: | Angleški jezik |
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| Vrsta gradiva: | Članek v reviji |
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| Tipologija: | 1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek |
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| Organizacija: | PEF - Pedagoška fakulteta
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| Opis: | The anti-reductionist who wants to preserve the causal efficacy of mental phenomena faces several problems in regard to mental causation, i. e. mental events which cause other events, arising from her desire to accept the ontological primacy of the physical and at the same time save the special character of the mental. Psychology tries to persuade us of the former, appealing thereby to the results of experiments carried out in neurology; the latter is, however, deeply rooted in our everyday actions and beliefs and despite the constant opposition of science still very much alive. Difficulties, however, arise from a combination of two claims that are widely accepted in philosophy of mind, namely, physical monism and mental realism, the acceptance of which leads us to the greatest problem of mental causation: the problem of causal exclusion. Since physical causes alone are always sufficient for physical effects mental properties are excluded from causal explanations of our behaviour, which makes them "epiphenomenal". The article introduces Van Gulick's solution to the exclusion problem which tries to prove that physical properties, in contrast to mental properties, do not have as much of a privileged status with respect to event causation as usually ascribed. Therefore, it makes no sense to say that physical properties are causally relevant whereas mental properties are not. This is followed by my objection to his argument for levelling mental and physical properties with respect to causation of events. I try to show that Van Gulick's argument rests on a premise that no serious physicalist can accept |
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| Ključne besede: | antireductionism, mental causation, exclusion, token physicalism, causal exclusion, epiphenomenalism, explanatory practice |
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| Leto izida: | 2004 |
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| PID: | 20.500.12556/DKUM-36110  |
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| UDK: | 122 |
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| COBISS.SI-ID: | 13822216 |
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| ISSN pri članku: | 0353-5150 |
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| NUK URN: | URN:SI:UM:DK:SJEMKRJD |
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| Datum objave v DKUM: | 07.06.2012 |
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| Število ogledov: | 1516 |
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| Število prenosov: | 94 |
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| Metapodatki: |    |
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| Področja: | Ostalo
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