| Naslov: | Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment |
|---|
| Avtorji: | ID Chen, Xiaojie (Avtor)
ID Szolnoki, Attila (Avtor)
ID Perc, Matjaž (Avtor) |
|---|
| Datoteke: |  New_Journal_of_Physics_2014_Chen,_Szolnoki,_Perc_Probabilistic_sharing_solves_the_problem_of_costly_punishment.pdf (1,52 MB)
MD5: 89A87294E70C2748A57CDDD38B3A12CA
 http://stacks.iop.org/1367-2630/16/i=8/a=083016?key=crossref.386c85aae3cd7994fe38ee525f977410
|
|---|
| Jezik: | Angleški jezik |
|---|
| Vrsta gradiva: | Članek v reviji |
|---|
| Tipologija: | 1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek |
|---|
| Organizacija: | FNM - Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko
|
|---|
| Opis: | Cooperators that refuse to participate in sanctioning defectors create the secondorder free-rider problem. Such cooperators will not be punished because they contribute to the public good, but they also eschew the costs associated with punishing defectors. Altruistic punishers - those that cooperate and punish - are at a disadvantage, and it is puzzling how such behaviour has evolved. We show that sharing the responsibility to sanction defectors rather than relying on certain individuals to do so permanently can solve the problem of costly punishment. Inspired by the fact that humans have strong but also emotional tendencies for fair play, we consider probabilistic sanctioning as the simplest way of distributing the duty. In well-mixed populations the public goods game is transformed into a coordination game with full cooperation and defection as the two stable equilibria, while in structured populations pattern formation supports additional counterintuitive solutions that are reminiscent of Parrondoʼs paradox. |
|---|
| Ključne besede: | social dynamics, networks, punishment, public goods, econophysics |
|---|
| Status publikacije: | Objavljeno |
|---|
| Verzija publikacije: | Objavljena publikacija |
|---|
| Leto izida: | 2014 |
|---|
| Št. strani: | str. 1-15 |
|---|
| Številčenje: | Letn. 16 |
|---|
| PID: | 20.500.12556/DKUM-66559  |
|---|
| ISSN: | 1367-2630 |
|---|
| UDK: | 53 |
|---|
| COBISS.SI-ID: | 20806152 |
|---|
| DOI: | 10.1088/1367-2630/16/8/083016 |
|---|
| ISSN pri članku: | 1367-2630 |
|---|
| NUK URN: | URN:SI:UM:DK:FL3GSNI4 |
|---|
| Datum objave v DKUM: | 03.07.2017 |
|---|
| Število ogledov: | 1421 |
|---|
| Število prenosov: | 451 |
|---|
| Metapodatki: |    |
|---|
| Področja: | Ostalo
|
|---|
|
:
|
Kopiraj citat |
|---|
| | | | Skupna ocena: | (0 glasov) |
|---|
| Vaša ocena: | Ocenjevanje je dovoljeno samo prijavljenim uporabnikom. |
|---|
| Objavi na: |  |
|---|
Postavite miškin kazalec na naslov za izpis povzetka. Klik na naslov izpiše
podrobnosti ali sproži prenos. |
