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Naslov:More hope for conciliationism
Avtorji:ID Justin, Martin (Avtor)
Datoteke:.pdf RAZ_Justin_Martin_2025.pdf (256,86 KB)
MD5: 2E1B556976354BFEA39E4B5802957EE0
 
URL https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2025.22
 
Jezik:Angleški jezik
Vrsta gradiva:Znanstveno delo
Tipologija:1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija:FF - Filozofska fakulteta
Opis:The view that epistemic peers should conciliate in cases of disagreement– the Conciliatory View–hadbeenanimportant view in the early days of the peer disagreement debate. Over the years, however, the view has been the target of severe criticism; an “obituary” was already written for the view, and, as a recent proclamation has it, there is “no hope” for it. In this paper, I will argue that we should keep the hope alive by defending the Conciliatory View of peer disagreement. The primary strategy of my defense will be to separate the claims made by the view specific to peer disagreement and claims that concern higher order evidence more generally. This separation allows us to see which problems cannot be addressed in the context of peer disagreement alone. As I will argue, the upshot of making this distinction is that although the jury is still out on whether higher-order evidence should affect our first-order doxastic states, the Conciliatory View likely follows if it does.
Ključne besede:epistemology of disagreement, peer disagreement, higher-order evidences, concilatory view, self-undermining
Status publikacije:Objavljeno
Verzija publikacije:Objavljena publikacija
Datum sprejetja članka:16.03.2025
Datum objave:19.06.2025
Založnik:Cambridge University Press
Leto izida:2025
Št. strani:str. 1-21
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-94711 Novo okno
UDK:165.6
COBISS.SI-ID:240201731 Novo okno
DOI:10.1017/epi.2025.22 Novo okno
ISSN pri članku:1742-3600
Datum objave v DKUM:25.02.2026
Število ogledov:161
Število prenosov:1
Metapodatki:XML DC-XML DC-RDF
Področja:Ostalo
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Gradivo je del revije

Naslov:Episteme
Založnik:Edinburgh University Press
ISSN:1742-3600
COBISS.SI-ID:514857753 Novo okno

Licence

Licenca:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Priznanje avtorstva 4.0 Mednarodna
Povezava:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.sl
Opis:To je standardna licenca Creative Commons, ki daje uporabnikom največ možnosti za nadaljnjo uporabo dela, pri čemer morajo navesti avtorja.
Začetek licenciranja:19.06.2025

Sekundarni jezik

Jezik:Slovenski jezik
Ključne besede:epistemologija nestrinjanja, nestrinjanje, vrstniki, dokazila višjega reda, epistemologija nestrinjanja, samospodbijanje


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