| Naslov: | Supply chain game analysis based on mean-variance and price risk aversion under different power structures |
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| Avtorji: | ID Wang, Y. L. (Avtor)
ID Yang, L. (Avtor)
ID Chen, J. H. (Avtor)
ID Li, P. (Avtor) |
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| Datoteke: |  APEM18-1_104-115.pdf (1,16 MB)
MD5: FEF2860C1E380C74A5513DB22A880BE0
 https://apem-journal.org/Archives/2023/Abstract-APEM18-1_104-115.html
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| Jezik: | Angleški jezik |
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| Vrsta gradiva: | Članek v reviji |
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| Tipologija: | 1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek |
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| Organizacija: | FS - Fakulteta za strojništvo
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| Opis: | In view of the random retail price and retailer’s preference for retail price risk aversion, we used mean-variance to describe the uncertainty risk of retail price. To study the impacts of both the retail price uncertainty risk and retail price risk aversion preference on supply chain (SC) decision-making, we constructed a SC game model based on three different power structures, including Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) game, Retailer Stackelberg (RS) game, and Vertical Nash (VN) game. The results showed that the retail price uncertainty risk and the retailer’s retail price risk aversion preference weakened the manufacturer’s production effort input, decreased the retailer’s enthusiasm for ordering, and damaged the interests of manufacturer and retailer. Under the three different power structures, the production effort input of the manufacturer depended on the production effort affecting wholesale price efficiency and retail price efficiency. The retailer’s expected utility was largest under the MS game model and smallest under the VN game model. The manufacturer’s profits were closely related to each parameter under the three respective power structures. This study provides theoretical guidance for the decision-making of SC enterprises with retail price risk and retailer with retail price risk aversion preference under different power structure situations. |
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| Ključne besede: | supply chain game, mean-variance, retail price risk aversion, different power structures, game theory, vertical Nash game, retailer Stackelberg game, manufacturer Stackelberg game |
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| Status publikacije: | Objavljeno |
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| Verzija publikacije: | Objavljena publikacija |
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| Poslano v recenzijo: | 13.02.2023 |
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| Datum sprejetja članka: | 17.04.2023 |
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| Datum objave: | 29.04.2023 |
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| Založnik: | Chair of Production Engineering (CPE), University of Maribor Faculty of Mechanical Engineering |
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| Leto izida: | 2023 |
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| Št. strani: | str. 104-115 |
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| Številčenje: | Vol. 18, no. 1 |
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| PID: | 20.500.12556/DKUM-97027  |
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| UDK: | 658.5 |
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| COBISS.SI-ID: | 268064259 |
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| DOI: | 10.14743/apem2023.1.460 |
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| ISSN pri članku: | 1854-6250 |
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| Avtorske pravice: | Content from this work may be used under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Licence (CC BY 4.0). Any further distribution of this work must maintain attribution to the author(s) and the title of the work, journal citation and DOI. |
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| Datum objave v DKUM: | 12.02.2026 |
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| Število ogledov: | 162 |
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| Število prenosov: | 1 |
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| Metapodatki: |    |
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| Področja: | Ostalo
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