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Naslov:Strategic commitments shape collective cybersecurity under AI inequality
Avtorji:ID Bashir, Adeela (Avtor)
ID Shamszaman, Zia Ush (Avtor)
ID Song, Zhao (Avtor)
ID Perc, Matjaž (Avtor)
ID Han, The Anh (Avtor)
Datoteke:.pdf RAZ_Bashir_Adeela_2026.pdf (2,83 MB)
MD5: 6A03B31038672458C1381D3AFA7F5BA5
 
URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2026.118728
 
Jezik:Angleški jezik
Vrsta gradiva:Znanstveno delo
Tipologija:1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija:FNM - Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko
Opis:The growing integration of AI into cybersecurity is reshaping the balance between attackers and defenders. When access to advanced AI-enabled defence tools is uneven, resource-limited defenders may be unable to adopt effective protection, creating persistent system vulnerabilities. We study the impact of differential AI access using an evolutionary game-theoretic model in a finite population. We first show that when high-capability defence is costly, the population is driven toward low-cost, weak-defence behaviour, sustaining attacks and weakening long-run security. To address this problem, we introduce differential access to AI defence tools by allowing defenders to choose between low- and high-capability protection based on their resources. We then examine the role of a small group of committed defenders who always adopt strong defence and influence others through social learning. Although commitment increases the prevalence of strong defence, it alone cannot stabilise secure outcomes due to high defence costs. We therefore incorporate a targeted subsidy to remove the cost disadvantage from committed defenders. Our analysis shows that subsidised commitment significantly increases strong defence adoption, suppresses successful attacks, and improves overall system resilience. Simulations across a broad parameter space confirm that subsidies consistently outperform commitment alone. In addition, social-welfare analysis shows improved defender outcomes while keeping attacker gains low. These findings suggest that targeted support for key defenders can be an effective mechanism for stabilising cybersecurity in AI-driven environments and provide a theoretical bridge between cybersecurity policy, AI governance, and strategic allocation of defensive AI capabilities.
Ključne besede:evolutionary game theory, cybersecurity, AI security, finite population dynamics, differential AI access, committed defenders, social welfare, attack-defence strategies, social physics
Status publikacije:Objavljeno
Verzija publikacije:Objavljena publikacija
Datum sprejetja članka:25.06.2026
Datum objave:03.07.2026
Leto izida:2026
Št. strani:21 str.
Številčenje:Letn. 210, del 2, članek št. 118728
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-98815 Novo okno
UDK:004.8:519.83
COBISS.SI-ID:284242179 Novo okno
DOI:10.1016/j.chaos.2026.118728 Novo okno
ISSN pri članku:1873-2887
Datum objave v DKUM:09.07.2026
Število ogledov:368
Število prenosov:7
Metapodatki:XML DC-XML DC-RDF
Področja:Ostalo
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Vaša ocena:Ocenjevanje je dovoljeno samo prijavljenim uporabnikom.
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Gradivo je del revije

Naslov:Chaos, solitons & fractals
Založnik:Elsevier Ltd.
ISSN:1873-2887
COBISS.SI-ID:175447299 Novo okno

Gradivo je financirano iz projekta

Financer:ARIS - Javna agencija za znanstvenoraziskovalno in inovacijsko dejavnost Republike Slovenije
Številka projekta:P1-0403-2019
Naslov:Računsko intenzivni kompleksni sistemi

Licence

Licenca:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Priznanje avtorstva 4.0 Mednarodna
Povezava:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.sl
Opis:To je standardna licenca Creative Commons, ki daje uporabnikom največ možnosti za nadaljnjo uporabo dela, pri čemer morajo navesti avtorja.
Začetek licenciranja:03.07.2026

Sekundarni jezik

Jezik:Slovenski jezik
Ključne besede:evolucijska teorija iger, kibernetska varnost, varnost umetne inteligence, končna populacijska dinamika, diferencialni dostop umetne inteligence, predani branilci, socialna blaginja, strategije obrambe pred napadi, fizika družbe


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