PROGRAM PRIZANESLJIVOSTI - PONUDBA, KI SE NE BI SMELA ZAVRNITI?

Poš, Mojca

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Title:	PROGRAM PRIZANESLJIVOSTI - PONUDBA, KI SE NE BI SMELA ZAVRNITI?
Authors:	ID Poš, Mojca (Author) ID Ferčič, Aleš (Mentor) More about this mentor...
Files:	UNI_Pos_Mojca_2010.pdf (2,50 MB) MD5: C064074CC0C20A54E7140404888A9D8B PID: 20.500.12556/dkum/a9dc1a19-01b9-49ab-87ef-2040b1e786b2
Language:	Slovenian
Work type:	Undergraduate thesis
Organization:	PF - Faculty of Law
Abstract:	Ne glede na skoraj univerzalno zakonodajno prepoved kartelov se le-ti še naprej ustanavljajo in delujejo ter škodujejo družbeni blaginji. Konkurenčni organi držav se tako neprestano spopadajo z izzivom iskanja rešitev, s katerimi bi čim bolj uspešno preganjali kartele. Med njimi je tudi široka uvedba programov prizanesljivosti. Programi prizanesljivosti spodbujajo udeležence kartelov k razkritju kartelov v katerih sodelujejo in aktivnemu sodelovanju s konkurenčnimi organi v zameno za zaščito pred naložitvijo sankcij, ki jim sicer grozijo zaradi prepovedane kršitve. Spodbuja se jih k razkritju notranjih informacij iz prve roke, ki privedejo do odkritja kartelov in njihove hitrejše obsodbe z nižjimi stroški organov v primerjavi z drugimi metodami dela. V zameno jim je ponujena manjša denarna kazen, krajše zaporne kazni ali celo popolna odpustitev obojega. To ima več pozitivnih učinkov med katerimi so najpomembnejši zagotovo zmanjšanje stabilnosti kartelov, večanje učinkovitosti odkrivanja kartelov in njihove hitrejše obsodbe ter odvračanje od ustanavljanja novih kartelov. Pojavijo pa se lahko tudi negativni učinki, kot je npr. spodbujanje h kršitvi, saj zmanjšujejo pričakovane stroške kršitve. A praksa kaže, da prednosti veliko prevladujejo nad morebitnimi slabostmi. V diplomskem delu predstavljamo različne tržne strukture, ugotavljamo razloge za sodelovanje podjetij v kartelu in njihove spodbude za razkritje kartelov konkurenčnim organom. Nadalje analiziramo različno oblikovane modele programov prizanesljivosti in njihove učinke, prednosti in sporne aspekte programov prizanesljivosti ter predstavimo že delujoče programe prizanesljivosti nekaterih držav in njihovo uspešnost. Na podlagi vsega smo preučili ali so programi prizanesljivosti utemeljeni in smiselni, ugotovili kakšni programi prizanesljivosti so najbolj optimalni in uspešni ter predlagali ukrepe za izboljšanje trenutnega stanja.
Keywords:	konkurenčno pravo, oligopol, konkurenčni organ, kartel, program prizanesljivosti, samoovadba
Place of publishing:	Maribor
Publisher:	[M. Poš]
Year of publishing:	2010
PID:	20.500.12556/DKUM-15282
UDC:	34(043.2)
COBISS.SI-ID:	4123691
NUK URN:	URN:SI:UM:DK:HU7LLMWH
Publication date in DKUM:	09.09.2010
Views:	2782
Downloads:	1479
Metadata:
Categories:	PF
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Secondary language

Language:	English
Title:	LENIENCY PROGRAM - AN OFFER THAT SHOULD NOT BE REFUSED?
Abstract:	Regardless to almost universal legislative prohibition of cartels they still continue to form and operate and therefore detriment a social welfare. Antitrust authorities are constantly faced with the challenge of finding solutions to efficiently deter cartels. Among them is the widespread introduction of leniency programs. Leniency programs encourage cartel members to denounce the cartel in which they participate and to actively cooperate with competition authorities in return for protection against the imposition of sanctions, which they would otherwise face. It encourages them to disclose inside first hand information leading to the detection of cartels and their convictions faster and at lower costs compared to other methods. In return they are offered a reduced fine, shorter prison sentences or even complete omission of both. They are supposed to serve several positive effects of which are most certainly decreasing the stability of cartels, increasing the efficiency in cartel detection and speeding up their convictions and the deterrence effect on the creation of new cartels. However, there may also have an adverse effect such as to induce collusion since they decrease the expected cost of misbehaviour. But practice shows that the benefits greatly outweigh any disadvantages. The thesis presents different market structures; we note the reasons for companies to participate in the cartel and their incentives to report to the antitrust authorities. Further we analysis differently designed models of leniency programs and their effects, advantages and robustness issues of leniency programs already and present some of the programs that already took place in some jurisdiction and their effectiveness. Based on everything we have examined whether the leniency programs are reasonable and sensible, we found out what kind of leniency programs are the most optimal and efficient and we proposed some solutions to improve the current situation.
Keywords:	Competition policy, oligopol, antitrust authorities, cartel, leniency program, self-reporting

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