MORALNI HAZARD IN ASIMETRIČNE INFORMACIJE KOT DEJAVNIKA FINANČNIH KRIZ

Rožman, Nada

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Title:	MORALNI HAZARD IN ASIMETRIČNE INFORMACIJE KOT DEJAVNIKA FINANČNIH KRIZ
Authors:	ID Rožman, Nada (Author) ID Strašek, Sebastjan (Mentor) More about this mentor...
Files:	VS_Rozman_Nada_2013.pdf (455,90 KB) MD5: BB3427E5BAFE450A0D56E2A9E809ACF5 PID: 20.500.12556/dkum/7de84157-48f1-4cce-9853-c44bb6720616
Language:	Slovenian
Work type:	Undergraduate thesis
Typology:	2.11 - Undergraduate Thesis
Organization:	EPF - Faculty of Business and Economics
Abstract:	Finančne krize so reden pojav v svetovnem merilu in so skupek valutne, bančne in dolžniške krize. Avtorji jih razdelijo v tri generacije finančnih kriz, ki se nadgrajujejo. V zadnjem času je govora že o četrti generaciji finančnih kriz, to so bodoče krize. Sodobna finančna kriza je po obsegu in moči zelo podobna krizi pred drugo svetovno vojno. Bolj kot v preteklosti igra pomembno vlogo asimetrija informacij, ki vodi v nasprotno izbiro in moralni hazard, ki pa nista edina razloga za nastanek finančne krize. Zagotovo bi lahko z bolj transparentnim in odkritim poslovanjem (tako na mikro- kot tudi makronivoju) odpravili nastanek asimetričnih informacij in posledično s tem ne bi vodilo držav in finančnih institucij v moralni hazard. Ugotavljamo, da zgolj varčevalni ukrepi ne morejo potegniti držav iz finančne krize, ampak je potreben močan gospodarski zagon in rast, kar je mogoče le z razbremenitvijo gospodarstva in spodbujanjem »vlečnih konjev« v gospodarstvu, kar bo vodilo v trajen investicijski ciklus.
Keywords:	Finančna kriza, asimetrija informacij, moralni hazard, Evropska unija
Place of publishing:	Maribor
Publisher:	[N. Rožman]
Year of publishing:	2013
PID:	20.500.12556/DKUM-40453
UDC:	338.1
COBISS.SI-ID:	11471900
NUK URN:	URN:SI:UM:DK:P0O9B874
Publication date in DKUM:	13.08.2013
Views:	2789
Downloads:	505
Metadata:
Categories:	EPF
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Secondary language

Language:	English
Title:	MORAL HAZARD AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AS FACTORS OF FINANCIAL CRISIS
Abstract:	Financial crisis is a regular phenomenon in the world and is a combination of currency, banking and debt crisis. Authors divide them into three generations of financial crises, which are being upgraded. Lately, we have been talking a lot about the fourth generation of financial crises that describe the future crises. The modern financial crisis is very similar in the scope and the power to the crises that occurred before the World War II. More than in the past, the asymmetric information plays an important role and leads to the adverse selection and moral hazard. We discovered that they are not the only reason for the emergence of the financial crisis. It would certainly be possible that with more transparent and honest operations (both at micro and macro level) we can eliminate the formation of asymmetric information and, consequently, it would not have led countries and financial institutions to moral hazard. We find that austerity measures alone cannot pull the country from the financial crisis, but the need for a strong economic momentum and growth, which is only possible by balancing the economy and the promotion of “pulling horses” in the economy, which will lead to a permanent investment cycle.
Keywords:	Financial crisis, asymmetric information, moral hazard, European Union

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