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Title:LBO in MBO - anomaliji slovenske privatizacije : magistrsko delo
Authors:ID Viraj, Aljaž (Author)
ID Tičar, Bojan (Mentor) More about this mentor... New window
Files:.pdf MAG_Viraj_Aljaz_2014.pdf (1,55 MB)
MD5: 0C3F8E427E831F19D2CC7AC5BF143575
 
Language:Slovenian
Work type:Master's thesis/paper
Typology:2.09 - Master's Thesis
Organization:FVV - Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security
Abstract:Menedžerski prevzemi (MBO) so ena od številnih oblik odkupa s finančnim vzvodom (LBO). MBO je prevzem, pri katerem se odkup gospodarske družbe izvede z lastniškim in predvsem dolžniškim kapitalom, ki se ga pridobi od bank ali drugih institucij, prevzemniki pa prihajajo iz ciljne družbe. Finančni vzvod se uporablja zaradi nekaterih pozitivnih učinkov, ki jih ima na prevzeto družbo (večja dobičkonosnost lastniškega kapitala, nadzorna funkcija dolga itd.). Poudariti je potrebno, da je zelo težko dajati enoznačne zaključke glede učinkov LBO in MBO, ker ima vsak odkup svoje specifične značilnosti. Kaže pa, da lahko LBO in MBO pozitivno vplivata na poslovanje prevzete družbe. Vpliv je lahko direkten ali indirekten. Po prevzemu je zaradi dolga premoženje družbe potrebno uporabljati bolj učinkovito, stroške je potrebno zniževati z osredotočanjem na dejavnost, ki je najbolj dobičkonosna. Menedžerjeva vključenost v lastniško strukturo družbe pomeni boljšo motiviranost, zmanjšajo se stroški in problem agentov, menedžerji pridobijo več nadzora itd. Posledica zniževanja stroškov je tudi odpuščanje zaposlenih. Po začetnem odpuščanju v določenem časovnem obdobju je po izvedbi prevzema mogoče spet zaznati povečano zaposlovanje, v nekaterih primerih število zaposlenih preseže tistega pred izvedbo prevzema. Gospodarska kriza, ki se je začela leta 2008, je naplavila številne MBO, ki pomembno doprinesejo k finančnim težavam, s katerimi se Slovenija sooča še danes. Primeri, ki sem jih analiziral, kažejo nekatere podobnosti. Ker je slovenski trg kapitala slabo razvit (pri MBO ni podpore raznih skladov, ki jih poznajo v tujini), se nepravilnosti nanašajo predvsem na financiranje prevzema oziroma s pridobitvijo začetnega kapitala. Prevzemniki na škodo ciljne družbe verižno preprodajajo bodisi nepremičnine bodisi deleže delnic ali pa ciljno družbo in njene hčerinske družbe po prevzemu, zaradi ugodne bonitete, izdatno zadolžijo. Ciljne družbe so zato po prevzemu obremenjene z dolgovi, kar zmanjšuje njihovo fleksibilnost na trgu. Velik problem se kaže v netransparentnosti, saj pri prevzemih sodeluje veliko število družb (tudi slamnatih) z namenom zamegljevanja povezav, na koncu pa veriga vodi do družb, ki so v tihi lasti prevzemnikov oziroma jih le-ti lastniško obvladujejo. Poprevzemne strategije v večini primerov, ki sem jih analiziral, ni zaznati. Večini je skupno tudi izigravanje upnikov preko prepisovanja nepremičnin na družinske člane ali vpisovanja zemljiškega dolga. Vložek lastniškega kapitala je nizek, kar prav tako vpliva na možnosti za to, da bo ciljna družba po MBO uspešna.
Keywords:gospodarske družbe, menedžerski prevzemi, finančni vzvodi, privatizacije, primeri, magistrska dela
Place of publishing:[Ljubljana
Place of performance:[Ljubljana
Publisher:A. Viraj]
Year of publishing:2014
Year of performance:2014
Number of pages:100 str.
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-46388 New window
UDC:005.591.41+347.733(043.2)
COBISS.SI-ID:2882282 New window
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:7QSLR3TS
Publication date in DKUM:28.11.2014
Views:1963
Downloads:450
Metadata:XML DC-XML DC-RDF
Categories:FVV
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Secondary language

Language:English
Abstract:Management buyouts (MBO) are a form of leveraged buyouts (LBO). An MBO is a buyout of a company by the incumbent managers, using debt financing from banks or other specialized financial institutions. Incumbent managers can also invest their own equity. Financial leverage is used because of some of its positive effects on the target company (higher profitability of equity, debt as a control mechanism, etc.). It has to be emphasized that due to the complexity and individual characteristics of each LBO and MBO, it is hard to give a definitive answer as to their effects on the target company. It does, however, seem that there is evidence to suggest that an LBO and MBO can have positive effects on the target company. The effect can be direct or indirect. After the buyout, the company assets have to be used more efficiently because of the high levels of debt. It also has to reduce costs and focus on activities where the profitability is highest. The management inclusion in the ownership structure means they are better motivated, the costs and problems associated with the principal-agent problem are lowered and their increased stock share gives them more control and freedom in the decision making. A consequence of cost reduction can unfortunately also be layoffs, although some evidence suggests that this initial reduction is followed by increasing the number of employees after a certain time period. The 2008 financial crisis has revealed a number of MBOs that play an important role in explaining the financial trouble that Slovenia is facing today. The cases I analyzed show a number of similarities. The Slovenian equity market not being as developed as in other countries and not having the specialized sponsor backing, means, that irregularities can be seen especially in financing the buyout. Incumbent managers either engage in linked reselling stock shares or real estate to the detriment of the target company and their subsidiaries or borrow heavily after the buyout using the target company. Consequently, the target companies and their subsidiaries become burdened with debt that reduces their flexibility. There is also a lack of transparency; a number of companies are used in the buyout process for the purpose of blurring the ties, which in the end lead to companies being controlled (in secret) by the incumbent managers conducting the buyout. There are few post buyout strategies detected. Most of the cases also include fraudulent conveyance or other forms of hindering creditors. Incumbent managers usually do not invest much of their own equity into the buyout.


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