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Title:Neodvisnost centralne banke in vpliv interesnih skupin
Authors:ID Ahtik, Meta (Author)
Files:URL http://www.dlib.si/details/URN:NBN:SI:DOC-SXLFSTEJ
 
Language:Slovenian
Work type:Not categorized
Typology:1.02 - Review Article
Organization:EPF - Faculty of Business and Economics
Abstract:V članku analiziramo splošno sprejeto načelo neodvisnosti centralne banke in predstavljamo njegov pomen za gospodarstvo. Sledi predstavitev novejših, alternativnih pristopov k analizi delegacije monetarne oblasti centralni banki ter analiza pomena interesov in preferenc centralnih bančnikov za vodenje monetarne politike. Nadalje je predstavljena zastopniška igra v primeru enega principala, ki vpliva na delovanje centralnega bančnika (agenta), nato pa še primer vpliva več principalov, zlasti z vidika posebnosti delovanja Evropske centralne banke.
Keywords:banke, bančništvo, centralne banke, neodvisnost, interesne skupine
Publisher:Društvo ekonomistov Maribor
Year of publishing:2009
Number of pages:str. 96-102
Numbering:Letn. 55, št. 1/2
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-52533 New window
UDC:336.711
ISSN on article:0547-3101
COBISS.SI-ID:9771804 New window
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:M5EFBHVF
Publication date in DKUM:10.07.2015
Views:1145
Downloads:55
Metadata:XML DC-XML DC-RDF
Categories:Misc.
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Record is a part of a journal

Title:Naše gospodarstvo : revija za aktualna gospodarska vprašanja
Shortened title:Naše gospod.
Publisher:Ekonomsko-poslovna fakulteta, Društvo ekonomistov Maribor, Ekonomski center Maribor
ISSN:0547-3101
COBISS.SI-ID:751364 New window

Secondary language

Language:English
Title:Central bank independence and interest group influence
Abstract:The paper analyses the generally accepted principle of central bank independence and its meaning for the economy. New, alternative approaches to the analysis of monetary policy delegation to the central bank are presented. Additionally, the importance of the interests and preferences of central bankers for the conduct of monetary policy is analyzed. The central banker acting as an agent can have one or several principals. Analysis of both types of situations is given, with special emphasis on the position of the European Central Bank.


Collection

This document is a part of these collections:
  1. Naše gospodarstvo

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