UKREPI ZAŠČITE BANK UPNIC PO POGODBI O PRESTRUKTURIRANJU KAPITALSKE DRUŽBE

Sigurnjak, Kristina

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Title:	UKREPI ZAŠČITE BANK UPNIC PO POGODBI O PRESTRUKTURIRANJU KAPITALSKE DRUŽBE
Authors:	ID Sigurnjak, Kristina (Author) ID Ivanjko, Šime (Mentor) More about this mentor...
Files:	MAG_Sigurnjak_Kristina_2016.pdf (1,36 MB) MD5: 5677363461BE2B1E130F97D911D8686F
Language:	Slovenian
Work type:	Master's thesis
Typology:	2.09 - Master's Thesis
Organization:	PF - Faculty of Law
Abstract:	Kapitalska družba, katere sposobnost servisiranja najetih posojil postane ogrožena, ima že v času pred nastopom insolventnosti, kot jo opredeljuje 14. člen Zakona o finančnem poslovanju, postopkih zaradi insolventnosti in prisilnem prenehanju, dispozitivne možnosti reguliranja svojih dolžniško-upniških razmerij. Med slednjimi navadno prevladujejo razmerja z bankami zaradi najetih kreditov. Stranke situacijo lahko sanirajo zunajsodno s sklenitvijo pogodbe o finančnem prestrukturiranju (angl. master restructuring agreement ali »MRA«). MRA poleg refinanciranja oziroma reprograma obstoječih bančnih terjatev uredi tudi predmet prestrukturiranja, pogoje za refinanciranja (tj. cena, pogoji črpanja in pogoji vračila kreditov), druge zaveze, ki jim mora slediti dolžnik, sankcije za kršitev plačilnih obveznosti in drugih zavez ter druge zahteve banke, ki naj bi pomenile ščitenje pred kreditnim tveganjem določenega komitenta. MRA zaradi ščitenja interesa bank prinese dokaj rigorozne ukrepe nadzora nad poslovanjem dolžnika ter stroge pogodbene obveznosti in sankcije za kršitve. Banke imajo tako preko MRA lahko znaten vpliv na poslovanje svojih dolžnikov, na njihove finančne in poslovne odločitve ter na samo vodenje; predvsem tekom procesa prestrukturiranja in trajanja pogodb z dolžniki. Na ta način se banke lahko izpostavijo neveljavnosti sankcij (npr. niso v celoti izpolnjeni strogi pogoji za odpoved kreditne pogodbe po 1067. členu Zakona o obligacijskih razmerjih), v skrajnih primerih pa tudi (odškodninski) odgovornosti zaradi škodljivega vpliva na družbo dolžnika po določili o povzročanju škodljivega ravnanja poslovodstva po 264. členu Zakona o gospodarskih družbah ter kot obvladujoča družba tako v dejanskem kot v pogodbenem koncernu (predvsem 541. – 543. ter 545. in 547. člen ZGD-1), če le so izpolnjeni pogoji koncernskih pravil o prevzemanju odškodninske in reparacijske odgovornosti.
Keywords:	Finančno prestrukturiranje, prostovoljno prestrukturiranje, načela prestrukturiranja, banka, upnik, insolventnost, pogodba o prestrukturiranju (master restructuring agreement), kreditna pogodba, zaveze (covenants), prenehanje pogodbe, direktor v senci, vpliv tretjih na organe vodenja in nadzora, poslovodenje, obvladovanje, dejanski koncern, pogodbeni koncern, kvalificiran koncern.
Place of publishing:	[Maribor
Publisher:	[K. Sigurnjak]
Year of publishing:	2016
PID:	20.500.12556/DKUM-61156
UDC:	347.191.6(043.3)
COBISS.SI-ID:	5202731
NUK URN:	URN:SI:UM:DK:L5CXOU8L
Publication date in DKUM:	24.10.2016
Views:	3377
Downloads:	335
Metadata:
Categories:	PF
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Secondary language

Language:	English
Title:	Protective measures of creditor banks under the Master restructuring agreement of corporations
Abstract:	A corporation, whose ability to service loans becomes compromised, has a possibility of regulating their relationships with its creditors before insolvency as it is defined by Article 14 of Financial Operations, Insolvency Proceedings and Compulsory Winding-up Act (ZFPPIPP). Predominant creditors are usually banks with their loans. Customers can rehabilitate their financial crisis in an out of court financial restructuring by signing a master restructuring agreement (MRA). In addition to refinancing and reprogramming of existing bank loans MRA usually regulates terms and conditions for refinancing (i.e. price, terms of repayment of loans etc.), covenants, to be followed by the debtor, the sanctions for breach of payment obligations (payment default) and other commitments which mostly represent hedging against credit risk of the debtor. To protect their interest, the banks in MRA bring fairly rigorous measures of control over the operations of the debtor and the strict contractual obligations and sanctions for violations. Therefore, banks may have a significant impact on the operations of their clients, their financial and strategic decisions, and management; especially during the restructuring process and the duration MRA. This way, banks can expose themselves to ineffectiveness of MRA sanctions (egg. not fully meet the strict conditions for terminating the credit agreement according to Article 1067 of Obligations Act, (ZOR)). In extreme cases also (compensation and reparation) liability due to the adverse impact on its debtor under the provisions of causing harmful conduct by debtors management according to Article 264 of the Companies Act (ZGD-1), as well as liability of the parent company in both, the real (actual) and the contractual group (mostly covered by Articles 541 - 543 and 545, 547 of the Companies Act), if the conditions are met.
Keywords:	Financial restructuring, voluntary restructuring, principles of restructuring, bank, creditor, insolvency, Master Restructuring Agreement, the credit agreement commitments (Covenants), termination of the contract, shadow director, influence of others to the management and supervisory bodies, management, actual concern (group), contractual group, qualified concern.

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