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Title:Korelirana pozitivna in negativna recipročnost v igri javnih dobrin
Authors:ID Horvat, Borut (Author)
ID Perc, Matjaž (Mentor) More about this mentor... New window
Files:.pdf UN_Horvat_Borut_2016.pdf (1,92 MB)
MD5: A631E90550756F7A1146A67795B4B906
 
Language:Slovenian
Work type:Undergraduate thesis
Typology:2.11 - Undergraduate Thesis
Organization:FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
Abstract:Osnovni cilj diplomskega dela je bil preveriti, kako se v igri javnih dobrin obnese strategija korelirane pozitivne recipročnosti oziroma strategija igralca, ki hkrati nagrajuje in kaznuje kot ena kombinirana strategija. Predstavili smo igro javnih dobrin, njena pravila, strategije in možna izplačila. Predstavili smo tri glavne elementarne strategije igranja igre javnih dobrin. Te so koooperacija, kooperacija z nagrajevanjem in kooperacija s kaznovanjem. Za primerljivost rezultatov skozi celo delo smo se potrudili izbirati parametre, pri katerih smo lahko direktno ali pa vsaj v okviru neke sprejemljive podobnosti primerjali rezultate. Pri predstavitvah elementarnih strategij se je pokazalo, da prispevajo k spodbujanju razvoja sodelovanja in da je kaznovanje od predstavljenih najuspešnejše, ker spodbuja sodelovanje tudi pri nižjih sinergijskih faktorjih. Predstavitvi elementarnih strategij sledi preverjanje, če prinaša združevanje korelirane pozitivne in negativne recipročnosti v eno strategijo kakšne evolucijske prednosti. Podobno kot pri predstavitvi elementarnih strategij smo se lotili tudi strategije hkratnega nagrajevanja in kaznovanja in dobili rezultate, ki kažejo, da neodvisno od sinergijskega faktorja, pri katerem smo izvajali simulacije, kombinirana strategija kaznovanja in nagrajevanja ni pokazala evolucijskih prednosti pred elementarnima strategijama nagrajevanja in še posebej kaznovanja. Pokazali so se sicer ozki pasovi pri zelo nerealnih parametrih, ko lahko kombinirana strategija pokaže svojo moč, a se tudi tu izkaže, da bi samo kaznovanje pri istih parametrih bilo boljše.
Keywords:igra javnih dobrin, sodelovanje, nagrajevanje, kaznovanje, korelirana pozitivna in negativna recipročnost
Place of publishing:Maribor
Publisher:[B. Horvat]
Year of publishing:2016
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-64395 New window
UDC:519.83(043.2)
COBISS.SI-ID:22723336 New window
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:9CUGSY2U
Publication date in DKUM:11.11.2016
Views:1647
Downloads:106
Metadata:XML DC-XML DC-RDF
Categories:FNM
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Secondary language

Language:English
Title:Correlated positive and negative reciprocity in the public goods game
Abstract:The basic aim of the thesis was to examine how the strategy of correlated positive reciprocity, works in the public goods game same as one combined strategy. We presented the public goods game, its rules, strategies and possible payouts. We presented three main elementary strategies of playing the game of public goods. These are cooperation, cooperation with rewarding and cooperation with punishment. For comparability of results throughout the thesis, we did our best to choose the parameters in which we can directly, or at least within a reasonable similarity compare results. In presenting elementary strategies it has been shown that they contribute to promoting cooperation especialy punishment as the most successful of them. In the main chapter we checked if combining correlated positive and negative reciprocity brings any evolutionary advantage to the combined strategy. Similarly as in the presentation of elementary strategies we began analysing the results of the simulation which included the combined strategy of simultaneously rewarding and punishing. The results show that regardless of the synergistic factor we used in the simulation, the combined strategy of punishment and reward showed no evolutionary advantage over elementary strategies of rewarding and particularly punishment. The combined strategy showed promising results in narrow lanes with very unrealistic parameters, but here also, punishment proved to be the better strategy at the same parameters.
Keywords:public goods game, cooperation, rewarding, punishing, correlated positive and negative reciprocity


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