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Title:If cooperation is likely punish mildly: insights from economic experiments based on the snowdrift game
Authors:ID Jiang, Luo-Luo (Author)
ID Perc, Matjaž (Author)
ID Szolnoki, Attila (Author)
Files:.pdf PLoS_ONE_2013_Jiang,_Perc,_Szolnoki_If_Cooperation_Is_Likely_Punish_Mildly_Insights_from_Economic_Experiments_Based_on_the_Snowdrift_Gam.PDF (522,94 KB)
MD5: 924C43F7975ED55696ADDDB3759F80DC
 
URL http://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0064677
 
Language:English
Work type:Article
Typology:1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
Abstract:Punishment may deter antisocial behavior. Yet to punish is costly, and the costs often do not offset the gains that are due to elevated levels of cooperation. However, the effectiveness of punishment depends not only on how costly it is, but also on the circumstances defining the social dilemma. Using the snowdrift game as the basis, we have conducted a series of economic experiments to determine whether severe punishment is more effective than mild punishment. We have observed that severe punishment is not necessarily more effective, even if the cost of punishment is identical in both cases. The benefits of severe punishment become evident only under extremely adverse conditions, when to cooperate is highly improbable in the absence of sanctions. If cooperation is likely, mild punishment is not less effective and leads to higher average payoffs, and is thus the much preferred alternative. Presented results suggest that the positive effects of punishment stem not only from imposed fines, but may also have a psychological background. Small fines can do wonders in motivating us to chose cooperation over defection, but without the paralyzing effect that may be brought about by large fines. The later should be utilized only when absolutely necessary.
Keywords:public goods, punishment, economic experiments, snowdrift game
Publication status:Published
Publication version:Version of Record
Year of publishing:2013
Number of pages:str. 1-7
Numbering:Letn. 8, št. 5
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-66280 New window
ISSN:1932-6203
UDC:53
ISSN on article:1932-6203
COBISS.SI-ID:19889928 New window
DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0064677 New window
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:EIVHJPIO
Publication date in DKUM:19.06.2017
Views:1353
Downloads:420
Metadata:XML DC-XML DC-RDF
Categories:Misc.
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Record is a part of a journal

Title:PloS one
Publisher:Public Library of Science
ISSN:1932-6203
COBISS.SI-ID:2005896 New window

Document is financed by a project

Funder:ARRS - Slovenian Research Agency
Project number:J1-4055
Name:Fizika evolucijskih procesov

Licences

License:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
Link:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Description:This is the standard Creative Commons license that gives others maximum freedom to do what they want with the work as long as they credit the author.
Licensing start date:19.06.2017

Secondary language

Language:Slovenian
Keywords:javne dobrine, kazen, ekonomski eksperimenti, igra sneženega plazu


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