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Title:Evolution of cooperation on scale-free networks subject to error and attack
Authors:ID Perc, Matjaž (Author)
Files:.pdf New_Journal_of_Physics_2009_Perc_Evolution_of_cooperation_on_scale-free_networks_subject_to_error_and_attack.pdf (684,60 KB)
MD5: 7A5C059D6CE94A04604FFA3CD08D3690
 
URL http://stacks.iop.org/1367-2630/11/i=3/a=033027?key=crossref.620f4921910754efffc821bf68ff7bf7
 
Language:English
Work type:Article
Typology:1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
Abstract:We study the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game on scale-free networks that are subjected to intentional and random removal of vertices. We show that, irrespective of the game type, cooperation on scale-free networks is extremely robust against random deletionof vertices, but declines quickly if vertices with the maximal degree are targeted. In particular, attack tolerance is lowest if the temptation to defect is largest, whereby a small fraction of removed vertices suffices to decimate cooperators. The decline of cooperation can be directly linked to the decrease of heterogeneity of scale-free networks that sets in due to the removal of high degree vertices. We conclude that the evolution of cooperation is characterized by similar attack and error tolerance as was previously reported for information readiness and spread of viruses on scale-free networks.
Keywords:evolutionary game theory, social dilemma, spatial games, complex networks
Publication status:Published
Publication version:Version of Record
Year of publishing:2009
Number of pages:str. 1-9
Numbering:Letn. 11
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-66543 New window
ISSN:1367-2630
UDC:519.83:53
ISSN on article:1367-2630
COBISS.SI-ID:13113366 New window
DOI:10.1088/1367-2630/11/3/033027 New window
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:CKCEKETY
Publication date in DKUM:30.06.2017
Views:1827
Downloads:424
Metadata:XML DC-XML DC-RDF
Categories:Misc.
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Record is a part of a journal

Title:New journal of physics
Publisher:Institute of Physics Publishing, Deutsche Physikalische Gesellschaft
ISSN:1367-2630
COBISS.SI-ID:21135621 New window

Document is financed by a project

Funder:ARRS - Slovenian Research Agency
Project number:Z1-9629
Name:Stohastika in kaos kot učinkovita promotorja kooperacije in reda v fizikalnih sistemih in družbi

Licences

License:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
Link:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Description:This is the standard Creative Commons license that gives others maximum freedom to do what they want with the work as long as they credit the author.
Licensing start date:30.06.2017

Secondary language

Language:Slovenian
Keywords:evolucijska teorija iger, socialna dilema, prostorske igre, kompleksne mreže


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