Racionalnost in čustva - problem odločanja

Peruš, Tina

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Title:	Racionalnost in čustva - problem odločanja
Authors:	ID Peruš, Tina (Author) ID Vezjak, Boris (Mentor) More about this mentor...
Files:	MAG_Perus_Tina_2018.pdf (719,57 KB) MD5: 09D0E1715EF3097324A65701652705F5 PID: 20.500.12556/dkum/4ecdc6fe-442f-40c7-a4c6-40c7a412a5dd
Language:	Slovenian
Work type:	Master's thesis/paper
Typology:	2.09 - Master's Thesis
Organization:	FF - Faculty of Arts
Abstract:	V magistrskem delu raziskujemo odnos med čustvi in razumom na primeru odločanja. Zgodovinsko gledano je bil odnos med čustvi in razumom vedno aktualna filozofska tema, o čemer priča krajši zgodovinski prikaz pomembnejših idej. Obravnavamo teorije čustev ter opredelimo pojma racionalnost in odločanje. Pokazati želimo, da sta racionalnost in čustvovanje med seboj povezana in prepletena procesa in pri odločanju oba igrata pomembno vlogo – ločevanje na razcepljena pola je tako neupravičeno in prenagljeno. Teorije dvojnega procesiranja govorijo o analitičnem in intuitivnem procesu sklepanja, ki se po svojih značilnostih razlikujeta, med seboj pa se dopolnjujeta, saj so prednosti enega šibke točke drugega. Tako sta v svojih lastnostih komplementarna, saj različne lastnosti obeh sistemov prispevajo k optimalnemu delovanju človeka. Čustva imajo pomembno vlogo pri intuitivnem sklepanju in s tem zavzemajo pomembno mesto v procesu odločanja. Teoretične ugotovitve o povezanosti čustev in razuma podkrepimo z izsledki nevroznanstvenih raziskav. Trdimo, da so čustva zapleten biološki sistem, ki lahko pripravi podlago za podrobnejšo kognitivno oceno. Čustvene pojave opredelimo s teorijo Antonia Damasia in dokazujemo, da imajo čustva pri presojanju v moralnih dilemah hevristično funkcijo. Hevristika je mentalni mehanizem, ki nas brez zavestnega napora vodi do rešitve problema; deluje s pomočjo zamenjave, saj namesto na kompleksen problem hevristika ponudi odgovor na manj zapleten problem. Čustva nosijo pomembne epistemske informacije o vrednostih in to lahko v veliko primerih storijo razmeroma točno. Toda primeri, v katerih je čustveni odziv povsem neupravičen ali neprimeren, dokazujejo, da čustva kot nosilci vrednostnih lastnosti ne bi smela imeti večvredne vloge pri moralnem presojanju. To pomeni, da čeprav prinašajo edinstvene informacije o vrednostih, čustva niso avtomatično najvišja instanca, ko se sprašujemo o tem, ali lahko upravičijo sodbo v moralnih dilemah.
Keywords:	Čustva, racionalnost, odločanje, hevristika, moralno presojanje
Place of publishing:	Maribor
Publisher:	[T. Peruš]
Year of publishing:	2018
PID:	20.500.12556/DKUM-69329
UDC:	159.942:165.63(043.2)
COBISS.SI-ID:	24079624
NUK URN:	URN:SI:UM:DK:BJQ6DD8S
Publication date in DKUM:	15.10.2018
Views:	2033
Downloads:	329
Metadata:
Categories:	FF
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Licences

License:	CC BY-NC-ND 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Link:	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Description:	The most restrictive Creative Commons license. This only allows people to download and share the work for no commercial gain and for no other purposes.
Licensing start date:	04.01.2018

Secondary language

Language:	English
Title:	Rationality and emotions - the problem of decision making
Abstract:	This master's thesis explores reason and emotion and their relationship in the case of decision-making, which is the fundamental human process. Throughout history, the relationship between reason and emotion has always represented a topical philosophical subject, as demonstrated by a short historical overview of some significant ideas. The thesis also includes a discussion on theories of emotion as well as the definition of the terms rationality and decision-making. It aims to show that rationality and emotionality are two related and intertwined processes, both playing an important role in decision-making, which is why their polarisation is unjustified and precipitated. Dual-process theories speak of analytic and intuitive process of reasoning, which are different but at the same time complementary processes, as one’s advantages represent the other’s weaknesses. Consequently, the complementary characteristics of the two systems contribute to the optimal functioning of a human being. Emotions play an important role in intuitive reasoning and therefore occupy an important position in the decision-making process. Theoretical findings about the connection between emotions and rationality are supported by the findings of neuroscience research. The thesis argues that emotions are a complex biological system, which can provide basis for a more detailed cognitive assessment. Emotional phenomena are defined by Antonio Damasio’s theory, arguing the heuristic function of emotions in the assessment of moral dilemmas. A heuristic is a mental mechanism leading to the solution of a problem without any conscious effort. It operates with the help of substitution, offering the answer to a simpler problem instead of a more complex one. Emotions carry important epistemic information about value and, in most instances, can provide them relatively precisely. However, the cases in which an emotional response is completely unjustified or inappropriate suggest that emotions as carriers of value properties should not play a superior role in moral reasoning. This shows that even though emotions carry unique information about value, they do not automatically represent the highest court of appeal for the justification in moral dilemmas.
Keywords:	Emotions, rationality, decision-making, heuristics, moral reasoning

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