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Title:Ekonomska presoja enakih in usklajenih ravnanj na oligopolnih trgih
Authors:ID Ferčič, Aleš (Author)
ID Univerza v Mariboru (Copyright holder)
Files:.pdf LeXonomica_2010_Fercic_Ekonomska_presoja_enakih_in_usklajenih_ravnanj_na_oligopolnih_trgih.pdf (184,57 KB)
MD5: 836DFE32603E58017B8059412A22C4B4
PID: 20.500.12556/dkum/e1ca9815-5e36-4588-a822-9d480f061542
 
Language:Slovenian
Work type:Scientific work
Typology:1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:PF - Faculty of Law
Abstract:V tem prispevku avtor obravnava vidike ekonomske presoje enakih in usklajenih ravnanj podjetij na oligopolnih trgih, ki so z vidika kontrole oz. institucionalnega varstva tržne konkurence najbolj problematični, saj je zaradi tržnih zakonitosti težko razmejiti enaka ravnanja podjetij, tj. zaradi njihovega medsebojnega usklajevanja ali koordinacije. Pri tej presoji si lahko pomagamo z nekaterimi ekonomskimi modeli. Glede na to avtor v tem prispevku analizira nekatere ekonomske modele za presojo domnevnih usklajenih ravnanj na oligopolnih trgih in jih kritično ovrednoti. Na tej podlagi ugotavlja, da so dobrodošel pripomoček pri razumevanju naravnih enakih ravnanj in usklajenih ravnanj v smislu konkurenčnega prava, vendar ob tem opozarja na njihov omejen domet, ki izvira zlasti iz okoliščine, da analizirani modeli večinoma temeljijo na predpostavki stabilnosti oz. ravnovesij, ki pa so v praksi prej izjema kot pravilo.
Keywords:konkurenčno pravo, usklajeno ravnanje, oligopoli, teorija iger, Nashevo ravnotežje, Bertrandov model oligopola, Cournotov model oligopola
Publication status:Published
Publication version:Version of Record
Year of publishing:2010
Number of pages:str. 67-84
Numbering:Letn. 2, št. 1
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-71176 New window
ISSN:1855-7147
UDC:[339.13:347.733]+330.101
ISSN on article:1855-7147
COBISS.SI-ID:4126507 New window
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:47UIKG7C
Copyright:Univerza v Mariboru
Publication date in DKUM:23.07.2018
Views:1331
Downloads:80
Metadata:XML DC-XML DC-RDF
Categories:Misc.
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Record is a part of a journal

Title:Lexonomica
Publisher:Pravna fakulteta, Pravna fakulteta, University of Maribor Press
ISSN:1855-7147
COBISS.SI-ID:246384128 New window

Secondary language

Language:English
Title:Economic appraisal of equal- and concerted practices in oligopoly markets
Abstract:In this article the author deals with certain aspects of the economic appraisal of equal- and concerted practices on oligopoly markets. These markets are – as regards to the institutional protection of market competition – the most problematic, since it is difficult to define clear limits between non-coordinated and coordinated equal market behaviour of undertakings. Here one can use various economic models. For this reason the author analyses certain economic models for appraisal of supposed concerted practices on oligopoly markets, giving their evaluation or assessment. In this regard the author ascertains that, in principle, (analysed) economic models are convenient instrument for delimitation between “natural” equal behaviours and concerted practices of undertakings. However, he also underlines their limits, as these models are mostly based on the presumption of stability or equilibrium, what is – within the market – an exception rather than a market rule.
Keywords:competition law, market, oligopoly, game theory, Nash-equilibrium, Bertrand's model of oligopoly, Cournot's model of oligopoly


Collection

This document is a part of these collections:
  1. LeXonomica

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