Konkurenčnopravni vidik skupnega lastništva institucionalnih vlagateljev z divergentnimi manjšinskimi deleži : magistrsko delo

Koželj, Nuša

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Title:	Konkurenčnopravni vidik skupnega lastništva institucionalnih vlagateljev z divergentnimi manjšinskimi deleži : magistrsko delo
Authors:	ID Koželj, Nuša (Author) ID Ferčič, Aleš (Mentor) More about this mentor...
Files:	MAG_Kozelj_Nusa_2019.pdf (1,19 MB) MD5: AC90E9C99FFE9BC75E96650F27995F3B PID: 20.500.12556/dkum/116e2206-0ea1-4bad-8261-f974c108dfc2
Language:	Slovenian
Work type:	Master's thesis/paper
Typology:	2.09 - Master's Thesis
Organization:	PF - Faculty of Law
Abstract:	Nedavno so se pojavile empirične raziskave trga ZDA, ki izkazujejo protikonkurenčne učinke skupnega lastništva s strani divergentnih institucionalnih vlagateljev. Predmet magistrske naloge je razmeroma novejši pojav skupnega lastništva, ki se nanaša na situacije, v katerih ima eden oz. več imetnikov deležev podjetja neposredno ali posredno delež v kapitalu enega ali več konkurenčnih podjetij na istem trgu. Skupno lastništvo torej opisuje strukturo, kjer ima določen institucionalni vlagatelj deleže v več horizontalnih konkurentih znotraj iste panoge. Raziskave kažejo, da skupno lastništvo vodi k potencialnim protikonkurenčnim učinkom, kljub relativno nizki ravni deležev, ki se kažejo v višjih cenah. Taki učinki se lahko dosežejo na podlagi številnih mehanizmov, kot so glasovanje, izražanje mnenja na neformalnih srečanjih in določanje nagrad za poslovno uspešnost. Teorija glede skupnega lastništva, navaja, da v kolikor ima posamezni vlagatelj lastniški kapital v več konkurenčnih podjetjih znotraj iste panoge, si bo venomer prizadeval za povečanje celotnega portfeljskega donosa, namesto da bi bil osredotočen na dobiček posameznega podjetja. Posledično skupno lastništvo povzroča, da se konkurenčna podjetja kolektivno obnašajo manj konkurenčno in bolj monopolno, kot bi se sicer, če ne bi imela skupnega lastnika. Na žalost pa koristi, ki jih imajo imetniki deležev na račun diverzifikacije predstavljajo strošek za potrošnike in družbo kot celoto, učinkoviti kapitalski trgi s popolno diverzifikacijo pa posledično pomenijo mrtve izgube za proizvodnjo. Sporna točka priljubljenih razprav glede skupnega lastništva je, ali trenutna zakonodaja omogoča omejitev ravni skupnega lastništva oz. ali so potrebne regulativne prilagoditve, s pomočjo katerih bi zajezili protikonkurenčne učinke skupnega lastništva in s tem tveganja za učinkovito konkurenco. V zvezi z manjšinskimi deleži, se pravo EU o združitvah podjetij opira na test nadzora, ki pa ni nujno skladen z ekonomskim nadzorom, ki pokriva nižje ravni in druge oblike nadzora ali z učinki konkurence, ki izhajajo iz kombinacije sredstev ali interesov konkurentov. Komisija ima izključno pristojnost za pregled koncentracij, ki pomenijo trajno spremembo nadzora pod pogojem presežka določenega praga prometa, neobvladujoči manjšinski deleži pa v ta domet ne sodijo. Druga možnost, ki jo nudi pravo EU, sta člena 101 in 102 PDEU, na podlagi katerih so prepovedani sporazumi, ki omejujejo konkurenco in zlorabe prevladujočega položaja. Vendar pa tako člen 101 kot 102 morda nista najbolj primerna za učinkovito obravnavo pridobitve manjšinskih deležev. V zvezi s členom 101 je sporno, ali bi zgolj pridobitev deležev konstituirala sporazum, katerega cilj ali učinek je omejevanje konkurence. Nadalje, člen 102 zajema zgolj primere, kjer podjetje, ki pridobi manjšinski delež v določenem podjetju, že ima prevladujoč položaj na trgu in bi taka pridobitev deležev v drugem podjetju predstavljala zlorabo. Zdi se, da zakonodaji EU manjka praktično orožje za bodisi ex ante prevencijo bodisi ex post sankcioniranje protikonkurenčnih učinkov horizontalnih lastništev institucionalnih vlagateljev. Na evropskih tleh na žalost še ni vidnih razprav glede konkurenčnopravnega vidika skupnega lastništva. Medtem ko so se posvetovanja Komisije osredotočila na možne reforme nadzora združevanja podjetij, s čimer bi odpravili pravno praznino glede nadzora nad pridobitvami manjšinskih deležev, odgovora na vprašanje glede skupnega lastništva institucionalnih vlagateljev še ni na vidiku. Med vsemi državami članicami je zgolj Nemčija dosledno opozorila na predmetno problematiko.
Keywords:	skupno lastništvo, omejevalna ravnanja, neobvladujoči manjšinski deleži
Place of publishing:	[S. l.
Place of performance:	[S. l.
Publisher:	N. Koželj]
Year of publishing:	2019
Number of pages:	V, 65 str.
PID:	20.500.12556/DKUM-73632
UDC:	339.137:331.107.5(043.3)
COBISS.SI-ID:	5745195
NUK URN:	URN:SI:UM:DK:Z9GU9QPW
Publication date in DKUM:	28.06.2019
Views:	960
Downloads:	88
Metadata:
Categories:	PF
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Licences

License:	CC BY-NC-ND 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Link:	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Description:	The most restrictive Creative Commons license. This only allows people to download and share the work for no commercial gain and for no other purposes.
Licensing start date:	27.05.2019

Secondary language

Language:	English
Title:	Common Ownership by Institutional Investors with Diversified Minority Shareholdings as a Competition Concern
Abstract:	The burgeoning line of literature on common ownership has attracted plenty of attention that was triggered by empirical studies conducted in the United States, which provide empirical evidence of a possible link between the level of common ownership on account of institutional investors and anticompetitive effects. Common ownership describes a circumstance in which one or more of a firm's shareholders directly or indirectly has a concurrent equity interest in one or more of the firm's rivals. Common ownership therefore describes a structure in which a small group of large institutional investors holds significant stakes in multiple horizontal competitors in the same industry. The research suggests that common ownership leads to potential anticompetitive effects that arise despite the low level of shares held in form of increased prices. A number of mechanisms is said to support these anticompetitive effects such as voting, private engagement and management incentives. The theory underlying the common ownership research posits that when a single investor owns equity in multiple competing firms in an industry, management of the competing firms will seek to maximize the total portfolio returns of the common owner, rather than maximizing the profits of their own individual firm. As a result, common ownership causes competing firms to collectively behave less competitively and more monopolistically than if they did not share a common owner. Unfortunately, the benefits to shareholders from diversification and good governance come at the expense of consumers, and to society at large. Common ownership has become the topic of an ongoing and controversial debate around whether any competition legal measures or regulatory steps need to be taken to limit the level of common ownership and thus reduce any concomitant potential risks to competition. In regards to minority shareholdings, European Union (EU) merger law relies on a control test, which does not necessarily correspond to economic control (lower levels of control) or to the competition effects resulting from a combination of assets or interests of competing undertakings. Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to review concentrations that entail a lasting change of control and meet certain turnover threshold, while the non-controlling shareholdings fall outside the EU merger control framework. Another possibility, provided by EU law, are Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU prohibiting agreements restrictive of competition and abuse of dominant position respectively. However, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU may not be suitable to deal effectively with anti-competitive minority shareholdings. Regarding Article 101, it is not clear whether acquiring a minority shareholding would constitute an agreement having the object or effect of restricting competition. Moreover, Article 102 captures only situations, when undertaking acquires a minority shareholding that already holds a dominant position in which the acquisition would constitute an abuse of dominance. It seems that EU law is found lacking in practical antitrust weapons against parallel horizontal shareholding structures by institutional investors. In Europe, the competition law policy discussion has not been visibly impacted for the time being. While Commission consultations focus on potential merger control reforms to address a perceived enforcement gap over non-controlling shareholdings, the issue of common ownership by institutional investors has been prominent in its absence. Only Germany seems to have taken note of the raised antitrust issue.
Keywords:	Common Ownership, Antitrust, Non-controlling Minority Shareholdings

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