| | SLO | ENG | Cookies and privacy

Bigger font | Smaller font
First page > Show document

Show document Help

Title:Pogajanja med revizorjem in revidiranim podjetjem
Authors:ID Sandić, Zoja (Author)
ID Zdolšek, Daniel (Mentor) More about this mentor... New window
Files:.pdf VS_Sandic_Zoja_2023.pdf (1,13 MB)
MD5: 714AA8DE1B6F05C79CD492E28DAA1CF4
 
Language:Slovenian
Work type:Bachelor thesis/paper
Typology:2.11 - Undergraduate Thesis
Organization:EPF - Faculty of Business and Economics
Abstract:Interakcije med revizorjem in revidiranim podjetjem so nekaj popolnoma vsakdanjega, vendar subjektivni pogled in manevrski prostor v računovodskih standardih mnogokrat privede do nasprotujočih mnenj – tukaj nastopijo pogajanja med revizorjem in revidiranim podjetjem. V diplomskem delu obravnavamo potek pogajanj, možne izide in glavne vplive na pogajanja, svoj fokus pa smo usmerili v ugotavljanje potencialnih dejavnikov v teh pogajanjih. Raziskali smo značilnosti pogajanj med revizorjem in revidiranim podjetjem, predstavili Dinamičen teoretičen model pogajanj med revizorjem in revidiranim podjetjem (angl. Dynamic theory–based model of ACM negotiation) avtorjev Salterio in Gibbins (2012). Predstavimo proces pogajanja ter časovnico poteka, pa tudi model procesa pogajanj po Brownu in Wrightu (2008), ki razdelita proces pogajanj na tri ključne faze: predpogajanja, pogajanja in fazo izida pogajanj. Obravnavamo potencialne razloge za pogajanja z revizorjem (na primer padec vrednosti delnic revidiranega podjetja na borzi, nižja odobrena posojila bank, višje obrestne mere in tako dalje), torej zakaj je smiselno, da želi revidirano podjetje prejeti mnenje brez pridržkov v svojem revizorjevem poročilu. Na podlagi literature pa preučimo tudi odziv trga in bank na različna mnenja revizorja, ko gre za kotirajoča revidirana podjetja. Opišemo različne pogajalske strategije revizorjev: tekmovanje, prilagodljivost, izogibanje, sodelovanje, sklenitev kompromisa in strategijo vzajemnosti. Hkrati predstavimo Model dvojnih pomislekov (angl. Dual Concerns Model), ki je tipologija reševanja konfliktov, razvita s strani avtorjev Blake in Mouton (1964). Ta model identificira zgoraj naštete strategije reševanja konfliktov. Bolj podrobno opišemo strategijo vzajemnosti, ki sicer ni del modela dvojnih pomislekov, vendar je razširjena njena uporaba med revizorji. S to strategijo se revizorji odpovedo manj pomembni zadevi v pogajanjih v zameno za uresničitev bolj pomembne zadeve v pogajanjih. Za strategije pojasnimo, v katerih primerih je njihova uporaba najbolj koristna in potencialno za revizorja prinese najboljše možne rezultate. V podporo temu predstavimo tudi dejavnike, ki določajo pogajalske strategije. Pogajalske izkušnje revizorja imajo vpliv na potek samih pogajanj. Pogajalske izkušnje pa niso nujno povezane z leti delovanja revizorja. Pomembno je, da se revizorji na pogajanja z revidiranim podjetjem pripravijo in predvidijo mogoče scenarije pogajanj. Le na ta način si zagotovijo najboljše možnosti za uspešno izpeljana pogajanja. Revidirana podjetja imajo relativno veliko moč v pogajanjih. Revizorji lahko s pogajanji tvegajo izgubo revidiranega podjetja kot stranke, saj je moč nakupa storitve revizije na njihovi strani. Enako kot revizorji imajo tudi revidirana podjetja svoje strategije za pristop k pogajanjem. Revidirana podjetja se najbolj poslužujejo strategij (vzajemne, sodelovalne), ki so sodelovalne narave. V diplomskem delu predstavimo tudi na kratko ključne lastnosti kakovostnega računovodskega poročanja in proučimo, kako revizorjeva pogajalska strategija vzajemnosti vpliva na kakovost računovodskega poročanja. V diplomskem delu ne potrdimo nobene hipoteze. Hipotezo »v primeru, da revizor predlaga za revidirano podjetje odklonilno mnenje o računovodskih izkazih, je smiselna poteza revidiranega podjetja ta, da se pogaja z revizorjem o potrebnih popravkih računovodskih izkazov, saj s tem poskuša obraniti vrednost delnic podjetja na borzi« in »Tekmovalna strategija v pogajanjih med revizorjem in revidiranim podjetjem revizorju zagotavlja najboljši možni izid pogajanj« ovržemo, hipotezo »pogajanja glede računovodskega poročila med revizorjem in revidiranim podjetjem pozitivno vplivajo na kakovost računovodskega poročanja, saj se s pogajanji z revizorjem izboljša kakovost računovodskega poročanja revidiranega podjetja« pa nismo ne potrdili in ne ovrgli.
Keywords:Revizija računovodskih izkazov, revizor, revidirano podjetje, revizijska pogajanja, pogajalske strategije, lastnosti revidiranega podjetja
Place of publishing:Maribor
Publisher:Z. Sandić
Year of publishing:2023
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-85129 New window
UDC:657.6
COBISS.SI-ID:170221059 New window
Publication date in DKUM:27.10.2023
Views:563
Downloads:117
Metadata:XML DC-XML DC-RDF
Categories:EPF
:
Copy citation
  
Average score:(0 votes)
Your score:Voting is allowed only for logged in users.
Share:Bookmark and Share



Hover the mouse pointer over a document title to show the abstract or click on the title to get all document metadata.

Licences

License:CC BY-NC-ND 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Link:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Description:The most restrictive Creative Commons license. This only allows people to download and share the work for no commercial gain and for no other purposes.
Licensing start date:19.08.2023

Secondary language

Language:English
Title:Auditor-Client negotiations
Abstract:Interactions between the auditor and the audited firm are commonplace. Still, the subjective view and room for manoeuvre in accounting standards often lead to conflicting views – this is where negotiation between the auditor and the audited firm comes in. In this bachelor thesis, we discuss the negotiation process, the possible outcomes and the main influences on the negotiation, and we focus on identifying the potential factors in audit negotiations. We explore the characteristics of auditor-audited firm negotiations, presenting the Dynamic theory-based model of ACM negotiation by Salterio and Gibbins (2012). We present the negotiation process and the timeline of the negotiation process, as well as the negotiation process model of Brown and Wright (2008), which divides the negotiation process into three key stages: the pre-negotiation, the negotiation, and the outcome stage of the negotiation. We consider the potential reasons for negotiating with the auditor (i.e., fall in the value of the audited firm's shares on the stock exchange, lower bank approvals, higher interest rates etc.), i.e. why it makes sense for the audited firm to want to receive an unqualified opinion in its auditor's report. We also draw on the literature to examine how the market and banks react to different auditors' opinions regarding listed audited firms. We describe the different negotiation strategies of auditors: competition, accommodating, avoidance, collaboration, compromise and reciprocity. At the same time, we introduce the Dual Concerns Model, which is a typology of conflict resolution developed by Blake and Mouton (1964). This model identifies the conflict resolution strategies listed above. We describe in more detail the strategy of reciprocity, which, although not part of the Dual Concerns Model, is widely used by auditors. Following this strategy, auditors give up a less important issue in the negotiation in exchange for the realization of a more important issue in the negotiation. For the strategies, we explain in which cases their use is most beneficial and potentially yields the best possible results for the auditor. In support of this, we also present the factors that determine negotiation strategies. The auditor's negotiating experience has an impact on the conduct of the negotiation itself. However, negotiating experience is not necessarily related to the auditor's years of experience. It is important for auditors to prepare for negotiations with the audited firm and to anticipate possible negotiation scenarios. This is the only way to ensure the best chance of a successful negotiation. Audited firms have relatively strong bargaining power. Auditors may risk losing the audited firm as a client by negotiating, as the power of engagement for the audit service is on their side. Like auditors, audited firms have their strategies for approaching negotiations. Audited firms most often use strategies (mutual, collaborative) that are cooperative in nature. In the bachelor thesis, we do not confirm any hypotheses. We reject the hypotheses "If the auditor proposes an adverse opinion on the financial statements of the audited company, the reasonable course of action for the audited company is to negotiate with the auditor on the necessary adjustments to the financial statements in an attempt to defend the value of the company's shares on the stock market" and "A competitive strategy in the negotiation between the auditor and the audited company provides the auditor with the best possible outcome of the negotiation". We neither confirm nor reject the hypothesis "Negotiation of the financial report between the auditor and the audited firm has a positive effect on the quality of financial reporting, as negotiation with the auditor improves the quality of the audited firm's financial reporting".
Keywords:Financial statements audit, auditor, auditee, auditor negotiations, negotiation strategies, client's characteristics


Comments

Leave comment

You must log in to leave a comment.

Comments (0)
0 - 0 / 0
 
There are no comments!

Back
Logos of partners University of Maribor University of Ljubljana University of Primorska University of Nova Gorica