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Title:Arguing about free will : Lewis and the consequence argument
Authors:ID Šuster, Danilo (Author)
Files:.pdf Suster-2021-Arguing_about_Free_Will__Lewis_and.pdf (207,76 KB)
MD5: D5E3A58750D84BDEE5934D0236E3251C
 
URL https://doi.org/10.52685/cjp.21.63.2
 
Language:English
Work type:Scientific work
Typology:1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:FF - Faculty of Arts
Abstract:I explore some issues in the logics and dialectics of practical modalities connected with the Consequence Argument (CA) considered as the best argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. According to Lewis (1981) in one of the possible senses of (in)ability, the argument is not valid; however, understood in the other of its possible senses, the argument is not sound. This verdict is based on the assessment of the modal version of the argument, where the crucial notion is power necessity (“no choice” operator), while Lewis analyses the version where the central notion is the locution “cannot render false.”Lewis accepts closure of the relevant (in)ability operator under entailment but not closure under implication. His strategy has a seemingly strange corollary: a free predetermined agent is able (in a strong, causal sense) to falsity the conjunction of history and law. I compare a Moorean position with respect to radical skepticism and knowledge closure with ability closure and propose to explain Lewis’s strategy in the framework of his Moorean stance.
Keywords:consequence arguments, ability closures, inability closures, compatibilism, ability, inability, closure, radical scepticism, Moorean stance
Publication status:Published
Publication version:Version of Record
Submitted for review:06.06.2021
Article acceptance date:15.11.2021
Publication date:27.12.2021
Publisher:Kruzak
Year of publishing:2021
Number of pages:str. 375-403
Numbering:Letn. 21, št. 63
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-91310 New window
UDC:141.5:16
ISSN on article:1333-1108
COBISS.SI-ID:91994371 New window
DOI:10.52685/cjp.21.63.2 New window
Publication date in DKUM:11.12.2024
Views:179
Downloads:13
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Categories:Misc.
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Record is a part of a journal

Title:Croatian journal of philosophy
Shortened title:Croat. j. philos.
Publisher:Kruzak
ISSN:1333-1108
COBISS.SI-ID:10932232 New window

Licences

License:CC BY-NC-ND 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Link:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Description:The most restrictive Creative Commons license. This only allows people to download and share the work for no commercial gain and for no other purposes.
Licensing start date:27.12.2021

Secondary language

Language:Slovenian
Keywords:argumenti iz posledic, logika sposobnosti, kompatibilizem, sposobnost, nezmožnost, zaprtost, radikalni skepticizem, Mooreova drža


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