Kredibilnost in odgovornost centralne banke

Gorišek, Tjaša

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Title:	Kredibilnost in odgovornost centralne banke
Authors:	ID Gorišek, Tjaša (Author) ID Taškar Beloglavec, Sabina (Mentor) More about this mentor...
Files:	VS_Gorisek_Tjasa_2026.pdf (1,51 MB) MD5: 84F51B3FF1CE5F2598DD8CF8AFB2482C
Language:	Slovenian
Work type:	Bachelor thesis/paper
Typology:	2.11 - Undergraduate Thesis
Organization:	EPF - Faculty of Business and Economics
Abstract:	V diplomski nalogi je predstavljena kredibilnost in odgovornost centralnih bank. Najprej opredelimo centralno banko, s poudarkom na njeni vlogi v sodobnem gospodarskem sistemu, kjer je odgovorna za doseganje in ohranjanje stabilnosti ter nudenje podpore. Govorimo o treh medsebojno povezanih konceptih: neodvisnosti, kredibilnosti in odgovornosti. Neodvisnost se deli na institucionalno, funkcionalno, osebno in finančno. Kredibilnost izhaja iz neodvisnosti in transparentnosti, je temelj za oblikovanje racionalnih pričakovanj gospodarskih subjektov in učinkovito izvajanje denarne politike. Odgovornost zajema obveznost banke za obrazložitev svojih odločitev javnosti. V raziskovalnem delu smo izvedli primerjalno analizo Evropske centralne banke (ECB) in Ameriške centralne banke (FED), kjer proučujemo njuno neodvisnost, odgovornost in kredibilnost. Ugotavljamo, ali so koncepti bistveni za stabilnost finančnega sistema ter za ohranjanje zaupanja gospodarstva in javnosti. Ugotavljamo, da ima ECB močnejšo institucionalno in pravno zaščito neodvisnosti, medtem ko je FED formalno neodvisen in bolj dovzeten za politične pritiske. Glede na kredibilnosti in odgovornosti pa ugotavljamo, da sta ključni za učinkovito denarno politiko in cenovno stabilnost, kot tudi zaupanje javnosti in gospodarstva. Zaključek kaže, da je kredibilnost centralnih bank tesno povezana z njihovo neodvisnostjo in odgovornostjo, kar prispeva k stabilnosti in trajnostni gospodarski rasti. Centralne banke z visoko stopnjo neodvisnosti so bolj uspešne pri vzpostavljanju zaupanja, kar omogoča stabilnost, nižjo inflacijo in prispeva k gospodarski rasti.
Keywords:	Centralna banka, kredibilnost, odgovornost, neodvisnost, Evropska centralna banka, Ameriška centralna banka.
Place of publishing:	Maribor
Publisher:	T. Gorišek]
Year of publishing:	2025
PID:	20.500.12556/DKUM-95150
UDC:	336.711
COBISS.SI-ID:	277410307
Publication date in DKUM:	07.05.2026
Views:	158
Downloads:	20
Metadata:
Categories:	EPF
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Licences

License:	CC BY-NC-ND 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Link:	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Description:	The most restrictive Creative Commons license. This only allows people to download and share the work for no commercial gain and for no other purposes.
Licensing start date:	08.09.2025

Secondary language

Language:	English
Title:	Central bank credibility and accountability
Abstract:	The thesis presents the credibility and responsibility of central banks. First, we define central banks, emphasizing their role in the modern economic system, where they are responsible for achieving and maintaining stability and providing support. It continues with three interconnected concepts: independence, credibility, and responsibility. Independence is divided into institutional, functional, personal, and financial. Credibility stems from independence and transparency; it is the foundation for forming rational expectations of economic agents and effectively implementing monetary policy. Responsibility encompasses the obligation of the bank to justify its decisions to the public. In the research part, we conducted a comparative analysis of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Federal Reserve (FED), where we examine their independence, responsibility, and credibility. We assess whether they are essential for the stability of the financial system and for maintaining the trust of the economy and the public. We assess whether they are essential for the stability of the financial system and for maintaining the trust of the economy and the public. We find that the ECB has stronger institutional and legal protection of its independence, while the FED is formally independent and more susceptible to political pressures. Regarding credibility and accountability, we find that they are crucial for effective monetary policy and price stability, as well as for public and economic confidence. The conclusion suggests that the credibility of central banks is closely linked to their independence and accountability, contributing to stability and sustainable economic growth. Central banks with a high degree of independence are more successful in establishing trust, which enables stability, lower inflation, and contributes to economic growth.
Keywords:	Central bank, credibility, accountability, independence, European Central Bank, American Central Bank.

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