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Title:Domoljubje in državljansko 'prijateljstvo'
Authors:ID Klampfer, Friderik (Author)
Files:.pdf RAZ_Klampfer_Friderik_2025.pdf (1,36 MB)
MD5: 088A625EA47CB73D60E298A635F3F9B4
 
URL https://doi.org/10.4312/ars.19.1.195-214
 
Language:Slovenian
Work type:Scientific work
Typology:1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:FF - Faculty of Arts
Abstract:John Rawls je v Teoriji pravičnosti približno takole povezal moralno poljubnost in ne-zasluženost: če si ne morem lastiti zaslug za določeno svojo lastnost, potem tudi nisem (bolj kot drugi) moralno upravičen do koristi, ki izvirajo iz njenega imetja. Državljanstvo se tipično podeljuje na podlagi določil, ki so v zgornjem pomenu moralno poljubna, naj-pogosteje kraja rojstva oz. državljanstva staršev. In čeravno je torej državljanstvo (točno določene države) v zgornjem pomenu besede moralno nezasluženo, le redki teoretiki problematizirajo nacionalno zakonodajo in ukrepe oblasti, ki sistematično favorizirajo domačine pred tujci oz. lastne državljane pred državljani drugih držav. V pričujočem članku kritično obravnavam poskuse, da bi po zgledu prijateljstva, kjer pristranskost po splošnem mnenju ne le, da ni moralno problematična, temveč velja za prototip moral-no vzornega medčloveškega razmerja, tudi domoljubje utemeljili na vzajemni skrbi in spoštovanju med sodržavljani. Če lahko namreč prijateljstvo generira medsebojne obveznosti in moralne razloge za delovanje, čeprav je izbira prijateljev v osnovi moralno poljubna, zakaj ne bi tudi v domoljubu videli človeka, ki - vsaj v političnih skupnostih, urejenih po demokratičnih načelih - v nekem smislu prijateljuje z vsemi svojimi sodržavljani in ima zato določene obveznosti izključno ali vsaj prvenstveno do njih? Toda že po nekoliko temeljitejši analizi normativne podstati običajnega, medosebnega prijateljstva se tovrstno 'državljansko prijateljstvo' celo v moralno idealiziranih političnih tvorbah izkaže za potencialno nevarno teoretsko utvaro. Lahko si, skratka, oddahnemo, ne bo nam treba po vsej sili 'prijateljevati' z neznanci in političnimi eksoti.
Keywords:prijateljstvo, pravičnost, moralna naključnost, Schwarzenbach, Sibyl
Publication status:Published
Publication version:Version of Record
Publication date:31.07.2025
Publisher:Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete, Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete, Založba Univerze v Ljubljani
Year of publishing:2025
Number of pages:str. 195-214
Numbering:Letn. 19, št. 1
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-96122 New window
UDC:172.15
ISSN on article:1854-9632
COBISS.SI-ID:259192835 New window
DOI:10.4312/ars.19.1.195-214 New window
Publication date in DKUM:24.02.2026
Views:120
Downloads:2
Metadata:XML DC-XML DC-RDF
Categories:Misc.
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Record is a part of a journal

Title:Ars & humanitas : revija za umetnost in humanistiko
Publisher:Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete, Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete, Založba Univerze v Ljubljani
ISSN:1854-9632
COBISS.SI-ID:233246720 New window

Licences

License:CC BY-SA 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International
Link:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
Description:This Creative Commons license is very similar to the regular Attribution license, but requires the release of all derivative works under this same license.
Licensing start date:31.07.2025

Secondary language

Language:English
Title:Patriotism and "civic" friendship
Abstract:In his theory of justice, John Rawls connected moral arbitrariness and undeservedness roughly as follows: if I cannot take credit for a certain property of mine, then I am not (any more than anyone else) morally entitled to the benefits of possessing, and making use of, that trait. Citizenship is typically assigned based on features that are morally arbitrary in the above sense, most commonly the place of birth and/or one’s parents’ nationality. And yet, although citizenship (of a particular country) is morally undeserved in the above sense, only a few theorists question the national legislation and the social policies that systematically favour natives over foreigners. In this arti-cle, I critically examine attempts to base patriotism on mutual concern and respect, considered constitutive of personal friendships, where bias towards someone is not only morally unproblematic but hailed as morally exemplary. Indeed, if friendship can generate mutual moral obligations and moral reasons for action, even though friendships are typically formed in a morally arbitrary way, why not also see in a patriot a person who (at least within political communities governed by democratic rule) in some sense “befriends” all her fellow citizens and, as a result, owes certain obligations just or primarily to them? However, a more thorough inquiry into the normative basis of ordinary, interpersonal friendship reveals this kind of “civic friendship” as a misconceived and potentially dangerous theoretical fiction, even in morally idealized political formations. In short, we can relax, as Slovene citizens we will not need to “befriend” strangers and political foes after all.
Keywords:friendship, justice, moral arbitrariness, Schwarzenbach, Sibyl


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