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Title:Cilji omejene epistemske racionalnosti
Authors:ID Tomat, Nastja (Author)
Files:.pdf RAZ_Tomat_Nastja_2025.pdf (379,96 KB)
MD5: D80BA9FE05623773958E11FD9D7D483F
 
URL https://journals.um.si/index.php/analiza/article/view/4942
 
Language:Slovenian
Work type:Unknown
Typology:1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:UZUM - University of Maribor Press
FF - Faculty of Arts
Abstract:Pojmovanja racionalnosti znotraj epistemologije se pogosto naslanjajo na idealizirane modele epistemskih agentov in okolja, v katerem ti delujejo. Omejena epistemska racionalnost je koncept, ki se takšnim idealizacijam poskuša izogniti in se pri postavljanju norm raziskovanja naslanja na empirične podatke o človeški kogniciji in epistemskem okolju. Izhaja iz Simonove omejene racionalnosti, Gigerenzerjeve ekološke racionalnosti in McKennove ne-idealne epistemologije ter deluje kot hibriden koncept, ki vsebuje tako normativne kot deskriptivne elemente in služi kot izhodišče za ponujanje epistemskih vodil, ki bodo pripomogle k izboljševanju naše epistemske situacije in doseganju epistemskih ciljev. Znotraj epistemologije zasledimo različne epistemske cilje, na primer oblikovanje resničnih prepričanj, upravičenje, znanje in razumevanje. V prispevku povzemam izbrane vidike razprave o epistemskih ciljih in vrednotah s poudarkom na veritističnem monizmu in prevprašujem, katere cilje bi morala zasledovati omejena epistemska racionalnost. Zaključujem, da lahko omejena epistemska racionalnost zasleduje različne vrste kognitivnega uspeha, ne zgolj resnice, vendar se omejuje na raziskovanje o tematikah, ki so za posameznika na nek način relevantne.
Keywords:filozofija, epistemologija, racionalnost, epistemski cilji, epistemske vrednosti
Publication status:Published
Publication version:Version of Record
Publication date:31.12.2024
Publisher:Univerza v Mariboru, Univerzitetna založba
Year of publishing:2024
Number of pages:str. 263-283
Numbering:Letn. 28, št. 2
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-97155 New window
UDC:165
ISSN on article:2712-4916
COBISS.SI-ID:243708419 New window
DOI:10.18690/analiza.28.2.263-284.2024 New window
Publication date in DKUM:20.02.2026
Views:131
Downloads:9
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Categories:Misc.
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Record is a part of a journal

Title:Analiza : časopis za kritično misel
Shortened title:Analiza
Publisher:Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti, Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti, Univerza v Mariboru, Univerzitetna založba
ISSN:1408-2969
COBISS.SI-ID:67716608 New window

Licences

License:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
Link:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Description:This is the standard Creative Commons license that gives others maximum freedom to do what they want with the work as long as they credit the author.

Secondary language

Language:English
Title:The goals of bounded epistemic rationality
Abstract:Notions of rationality in epistemology are often based on idealised models of epistemic agents and the environment in which they are embedded. The concept of bounded epistemic rationality aims to avoid such idealizations and proposes norms of inquiry based on empirical data about the limitations of human cognition and the features of the epistemic environment. Drawing on Simon's work on bounded rationality, Gigerenzer's notion of ecological rationality, and McKenna's programme of non-ideal epistemology, it functions as a hybrid concept that contains both normative and descriptive elements and offers epistemic advice that helps to improve our epistemic position and achieve our epistemic goals. Traditionally, epistemic goals include forming true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs, justification, knowledge, and understanding. In this paper, I summarise selected aspects of the debate about epistemic values and goals, focusing on veritistic monism, and reflect on the goals of bounded epistemic rationality. I conclude that bounded epistemic strives towards various forms of cognitive success, not only towards the truth, but limits rational inquiry to questions relevant to the epistemic agent.
Keywords:philosophy, epistemology, rationality, epistemic goals, epistemic values


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This document is a part of these collections:
  1. Analiza

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